The COMESA-SADC-EAC free trade area: Rules of origin – an impediment to regional trade and economic integration. by Qoto, Lackson
  
 
 
THE COMESA-SADC-EAC FREE TRADE AREA: RULES OF ORIGIN – AN 
IMPEDIMENT TO REGIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION? 
 
 
By 
 
  
Lackson Qoto 
214581501 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of 
Laws degree at the 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU NATAL 
COLLEGE OF LAW AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
SCHOOL OF LAW  
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Ms Clydenia Edwina Stevens 
 
 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I give thanks and praise to the Lord Almighty, without whose grace, love, and guidance this 
work would not have seen the light of day. 
I also express my deepest gratitude to my parents Lazarus and Maggie Qoto, whose love, 
emotional and financial support has seen me through every milestone in my academic career. 
Mum and Dad, you have worked very hard and sacrificed so much to enable me to acquire a 
decent education. For that, I will forever be grateful. 
I am also greatly indebted to my supervisor, Ms Clydenia Edwina Stevens whose patience, 
wisdom, criticism, and invaluable academic insights have been a source of encouragement 
right from the beginning to the very end of this dissertation. Her professionalism cannot go 
unacknowledged.  
I further acknowledge my sister Sibongile Qoto, friends Lungile Shandu, and Satch Morgan 
for their timely financial interventions at various stages of this dissertation. I am truly 
indebted and grateful.  
Lastly, I have spent many hours engrossed in books or engaged with my laptop to ensure the 
successful completion of this dissertation. My young family have thus had to bear with my 
absence time and again as I toiled to bring this work to fruition. To my wife Lorca, words 
alone cannot express how grateful I am for your understanding, constant encouragement, and 
belief in my capabilities. To my son, Walter Anotidaishe, I hope that one day you will be able 
to read this piece of work and it will inspire you to scale heights greater than those I have 
scaled. I dedicate this dissertation to you.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I, LACKSON QOTO, hereby declare that 
 
i. The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated, is my 
original work. 
ii. This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or for examination at any 
other institution. 
iii. This dissertation does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs, or other 
information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other 
persons. 
iv. This dissertation does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically 
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written 
sources have been quoted, then 
 
a. Their words have been re-written, but the general information 
attributed to them has been referenced; 
 
b. Where the exact words have been used, their writing has been placed 
inside quotation marks, and referenced. 
 
v. Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-author or editor, I 
have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually written by 
myself alone and have fully referenced such publications. 
vi. This dissertation does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from 
the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in 
the thesis and in the Bibliography sections. 
 
 
……………………………………........ 
214581501 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Tripartite Free Trade Area is a regional economic integration initiative that brings together 
26 African countries belonging to the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Southern African Development Community, (SADC) and the East African 
Community (EAC) regional economic communities (REC’s). Among the main objectives of 
the TFTA is the creation of a large single market with free movement of goods and services 
and the promotion of intra-regional trade. To this end, the tripartite member states undertake 
to progressively eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. Despite concerted efforts 
to remove barriers to trade among African countries, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain an 
obstacle to regional economic integration and thus reduce investment in the region. Among 
these NTBs are rules of origin (RoO). RoO constitute an essential element of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) to ensure that only eligible products receive preferential treatment. 
Overlapping membership to the COMESA, SADC and the EAC has led to the proliferation of 
RoO regimes among the tripartite member states that are often restrictive, highly protectionist 
and different in detail and application. Negotiations on RoO in the TFTA have shown that it is 
difficult to agree on a common RoO standard.  
 
Against this background this dissertation discusses the role played by RoO in the multilateral 
trade system. It examines the RoO applicable in the COMESA, SADC and EAC REC’s and 
assesses the impact of these RoO on intra-regional trade and economic integration. 
Furthermore, the dissertation examines the legal framework of the TFTA Annexure on RoO 
(Annex 4 on RoO) and conducts a comparison of the RoO criteria employed in the TFTA, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA and the Southern Common Market 
(Mercusor). The dissertation shows that while COMESA and EAC RoO are similar and 
relatively simple, SADC RoO are complicated and restrictive. The study further shows that 
Annex 4 on RoO has been designed in a manner that it is trade facilitating and thus has the 
potential to increase regional trade and economic integration. The dissertation offers policy 
makers modest suggestions that can be adopted to address the problems of divergent RoO 
regimes in the tripartite territory and improve public-private sector participation in the design 
an appropriate RoO regime.     
 
KEYWORDS: rules of origin, regional integration, TFTA, trade facilitation, COMESA, 
SADC, EAC  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Tentative Title 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area: Rules of Origin - An impediment to 
regional trade and economic integration in the tripartite territory?  
1.2 Background and statement of purpose 
For much of the past decade, Africa’s three major regional economic communities (REC)’s, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have been locked in 
negotiations aimed at creating the continent’s largest free trade zone. At the 1st COMESA-
SADC-EAC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 22 October in 
Kampala, Uganda, an agreement was reached for the establishment of a Tripartite Free Trade 
Area (TFTA).1 A declaration launching the negotiations of the TFTA was signed in 
Johannesburg South Africa on 12 June 2011, at the 2nd Tripartite Summit.2  
On 10 June 2015, at the 3rd Tripartite summit held in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, the Agreement 
Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area among the COMESA-SADC-EAC Community was 
signed by the Heads of State and Government of the three regional blocs.3 The TFTA was 
officially launched on 10 June 2015, with the signing of the Sharm El Sheikh Declaration 
Launching the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite TFTA. Interestingly, 24 out of the 26-
member states of the TFTA have signed the Declaration,4 while the TFTA Agreement has been 
                                                          
1 ‘Final Communique of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government’ 
available at 
https://www.tralac.org/wpcontent/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/FinalCommuniqueKampala_20081022.pdf 
accessed on 25 July 2017. 
2 ‘Tripartite cooperation’ available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-
integration/tripartite-cooperation/ accessed on 25 July 2017. 
3 ‘Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area among COMESA, the EAC and SADC’ available at 
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/tfta/1083-tfta-agreement-june-2015-english/file.html accessed on 
26 July 2017. 
4 Only Eritrea and Libya have not signed the Declaration. 
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signed by 21 of the 26-member countries.5 South Africa 6 and Madagascar 7 became the latest 
signatories to the TFTA Agreement following the finalisation and adoption of the three 
remaining Annexes on rules of origin, trade remedies and dispute settlement8,9. The TFTA 
Agreement comes into force after the deposit of the fourteenth instrument of ratification.10 
The TFTA represents a single free trade area consisting of 26 countries with a population of 
63211 million people and a combined GDP of an estimated US$1, 3 Trillion as of 2015, which 
contributes 57 per cent of Africa’s GDP.12 The TFTA Agreement identifies its objectives as: 
to promote economic and social development of the Region; to create a large single 
market with free movement of goods and services and to promote intra-regional trade; 
enhance the regional and continental integration processes; and build a strong Tripartite 
Free Trade Area for the benefit of the people of the Region.13  
In order to fulfil and realise these objectives, the tripartite member states undertake, among 
numerous other things, to progressively eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
goods.14 Although multilateral trade negotiations such as the TFTA have lowered the use of 
tariffs as barriers to trade, ‘the reduction in tariffs has been substituted by the utilisation of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs)’.15 NTBs are defined as ‘restrictions which are the result of prohibitions, 
                                                          
5 The countries that have signed the declaration so far are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, State of Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See 
https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html accessed on 26 July 2017. 
6 South Africa signed the TFTA Agreement on the 7th of July 2017 at the 6th meeting of the Tripartite Sectoral 
Ministerial Committee on Trade, Customs, Finance, Economic Matters and Home/Internal Affairs (TSMC) held 
in Kampala, Uganda. See Mangeni (note 39 below).  
7 Madagascar signed the TFTA Agreement on the 13th of July 2017. See ‘Madagascar signs Tripartite Free 
Trade Agreement’ (note 12 below) 
8 ‘Tripartite signatures rise to 20’ available at http://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/e-comesa-
newsletter_525.pdf accessed on 26 July 2017. 
9 In terms of Article 44 of the TFTA Agreement, member states undertook ‘to conclude negotiations on 
outstanding issues under Phase I as set out in Annex I on Elimination of Customs Duties, Annex II on Trade 
Remedies and Annex 4 on Rules of Origin after the launch of the Tripartite 
Free Trade Area.’ 
10 TFTA Agreement, Article 39(3).  
11 Z Mabuza & D Luke ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement: A milestone for Africa’s regional 
integration process’ (23 June 2015) available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/the-
tripartite-free-trade-area-agreement-a-milestone-for-africa%e2%80%99s accessed on 9 August 2017. 
12 See ‘Madagascar signs Tripartite Free Trade Agreement’- 19 July 2017 available at  
 https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11904-madagascar-signs-tripartite-free-trade-agreement.html accessed on 
the 9 August 2017.  
13 TFTA Agreement, Article 4. 
14 Ibid Article 5(1). 
15 W Viljoen ‘Non-tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement’ 
2011, 1 available at https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/4240/n11wp072011ntbsintripartitefta20110330fin.pdf  
accessed on 26 July 2017.  
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conditions or specific market requirements which make the import or export of products 
difficult and or costly.’16 Such restrictions can arise from a number of measures put in place by 
governments including import bans, general or product specific quotas, unjustified sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary conditions, quality conditions imposed by the importing country on the 
exporting countries and complex or discriminatory rules of origin (RoO). The focus of this 
dissertation is on RoO. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on RoO 17 defines 
RoO as ‘those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application 
applied by any Member to determine the country of origin of goods…’.18 More importantly, 
and of particular relevance to this thesis, Annex 4 to the TFTA19 , which deals with RoO, 
defines RoO as:  
those laws, regulations and administrative determination of general application applied 
by any member state under the Agreement to determine the country of origin of goods. 
20  
As such, RoO ‘specify how much processing must take place locally before goods are 
considered to be the product of the exporting country. The objective is to facilitate preferential 
trade between trade partners.’21 
Although the TFTA is made up of three different RECs, there is however, an overlap of 
membership in the RECs with some member states belonging to more than one REC.22 Most 
of the member states of the EAC are also member states of COMESA whilst at least seven 
countries have dual membership in COMESA and SADC. Because of this overlap in 
membership, there has been a proliferation of RoO regimes in the RECs. Consequently, each 
REC has its own RoO and certification processes which has the effect of limiting trade among 
the RECs.23  Member countries of the different RECs who also belong to another REC end up 
                                                          
16 ‘Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade’ Available at http://www.tradebarriers.org/ntb/non_tariff_barriers accessed on 
26 July 2017.  
17 Agreement on Rules of Origin, December 15, 1993, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143. [Hereinafter ARoO] 
18 Ibid Article 1.   
19 Annex 4 on Rules of Origin (under Article 12 to the TFTA Agreement) available at 
https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Tripartite_FTA/TFTA%20Annex%2004%20Rules%20of%20Origin%
20Revised%20Dec%202010.pdf accessed on 26 July 2017. [Hereinafter Annex 4 on RoO] 
20 Ibid Article 1(1). 
21 ‘Good progress on Tripartite FTA; Rules of Origin remain a challenge’ Bridges Africa 23 August 2014 
available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/good-progress-on-tripartite-fta-rules-of-
origin-remain-a-challenge accessed 26 July 2017. 
22 This is known as the spaghetti bowl phenomenon.  
23 ‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional 
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utilising only those RoO ‘which are beneficial and simplest to use’ and also employ ‘two 
different sets of rules of origin when trading with different countries which are members of 
different RECs.’24   It is thus unsurprising that negotiations on the RoO that will apply to  the 
whole of the TFTA have been long and drawn out, giving testimony to the fact that it has been 
difficult to agree on a common RoO standard that can apply in the whole of the TFTA.25 
 It should be noted that the TFTA must comply with Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),26 which permits member states of the WTO to form preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) wherein they extend tariff concessions to each other that they do not 
extend to other members outside the PTA. This is an exception to the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle embodied in Article 1 of GATT. The MFN principle, widely regarded as one 
of the most important principles under WTO law, requires member states to accord the same 
preferential treatment that they afford any member of the WTO to all members of the WTO. In 
relation to trade in goods, ‘a Member must provide any benefit it accords to the products of 
one country (whether or not that country is a WTO Member) to the products of all WTO 
Members.’27 A further requirement is that the TFTA, as a FTA should be reported to 
GATT/WTO to ensure compatibility with GATT/WTO principles.28   
Furthermore, the TFTA RoO has to be in line with the ARoO. The ARoO aims at harmonizing 
non-preferential RoO used by signatory countries into a single set of international rules ‘in a 
way that prevents such rules from becoming obstacles to trade.’29 Work at harmonizing RoO 
is ongoing spearheaded by the Harmonization Work Programme (HWP). The HWP was 
supposed to have been completed three years after the entry into force of the WTO agreement30, 
                                                          
Economic Communities’ 2006 Economic Commission for Africa, 55 available at 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria2_eng.pdf accessed 9 August 2017.     
24 Viljoen (note 15 above) 9. 
25 E Naumann ‘The Tripartite FTA: Background and overview of progress made in developing new and 
harmonised rules of origin’ 2014 tralac Trade Brief No. T14TB01/2014 available at 
https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/5808-the-tripartite-fta-background-and-overview-of-progress-made-
in-developing-new-harmonized-rules-of-origin.html accessed on 9 August 2017.  
26 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm accessed 9 August 2017. The relevance of Article 
XXIV and its relationship to RoO is discussed in sections 2.2.6 and 2.2.7 below.   
27 T Voon ‘Eliminating Trade Remedies form the WTO: Lessons from regional trade agreements’ 2010 (59) 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 625–666, 628.  
28 See Marceau & Reiman (note 165 below) 310, discussing the notification of RTAs and their examination by 
the WTO membership. See also Komuro (note 355 below) 710, for a brief discussion of the requirements that 
must be satisfied for a regional trade agreement to constitute a FTA in the context of GATT Article XXIV. 
29 H Mabrouk ‘Rules of origin as international trade hindrances’ (2010) 5 (1) Entrepreneurial Business Law 
Journal 97-176, 104.  
30 ARoO, Article 9(2). 
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but the complexity of the issues being discussed and the inability of member states to reach a 
consensus on these issues has hampered any progress to achieve the complete harmonisation 
of non-preferential RoO.31 Pending the completion of the HWP, member states are required to, 
among other things, ensure that RoO ‘shall not themselves create restrictive, distorting, or 
disruptive effects on international trade’32 and ‘are administered in a consistent, uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner.’33 
1.3 Rationale for the thesis 
 
The TFTA Agreement seeks to establish a larger market, with a single economic space. Such 
economic space will be more attractive to investment and large-scale production.34 This is in 
turn expected to increase trade flows and regional economic integration. Despite concerted 
efforts to remove barriers to trade among African countries, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain 
an obstacle to regional economic integration and thus reduce investment in the region. Among 
these NTBs are RoO. RoO constitute an essential element of PTAs to ensure that only eligible 
products receive tariff preferences. The idea of PTAs is the facilitation of greater trade flows 
between member countries. In this context therefore, ‘the objective of preferential RoO is the 
facilitation of preferential trade between preferential partners without opening up such a trade 
regime to goods simply transhipped from third countries.’35  
 
The member countries in each of the three RECs forming the TFTA have in existence regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) that are applicable between the trading partners of each REC. As 
already noted above, the lack of a harmonised RoO standard has led to a proliferation of RoO 
regimes in the RTAs. Apart from being restrictive and highly protectionist, these RoO regimes 
are ‘often substantially different in detail and application.’36 The three RECs have been trying 
to find common ground in the TFTA negotiations. Although negotiations on most of the 
Annexes to the TFTA Agreement had already been completed when the TFTA Agreement was 
launched on 10 June 2015, negotiations on Annex 4 on RoO proved to be difficult and 
complicated and were only completed in July 2017.  
                                                          
31 ‘Technical Information on Rules of Origin’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm Accessed on the 9th of August 2017 
32 ARoO, Article 2(c). 
33 ARoO, Article 2(e). 
34 ‘Tripartite Free Trade Progress Report’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/wpcontent/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/draft_TaskForce_Progress_Rep_Impl_Decisio
ns_1st_Summit.pdf  accessed on 26 July 2017. 
35 Naumann (note 25 above) 2.  
36 Ibid 3  
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It therefore remains to be seen whether the recent completion on the legal scrubbing of Annex 
4on RoO will lead to ratification of the TFTA Agreement. As only those countries that will 
ratify the Agreement will be bound by it, ‘it remains a possibility that some participating states 
(doubting the benefits or considering the CFTA to be a better option) will not become TFTA 
parties.’37 It is worth repeating that a total of 14 ratifications are required for the agreement to 
enter into force.38 As of 10 July 2017, only Egypt has ratified the Agreement.39  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main objectives of the TFTA is the progressive elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and the liberalization of trade in services, with 
the aim of increasing trade and contributing to the deepening of integration of Tripartite 
member states. With the recent completion of negotiations on Annex 4 on RoO, and bearing in 
mind the objectives of the TFTA, it becomes of necessity to examine the RoO that will apply 
in the TFTA with the aim of establishing whether they impose an impediment to regional trade 
and economic integration. This thesis is thus of great significance in so far as it relates to a 
FTA that will pave way for the envisaged massive economic integration in the tripartite 
territory with particular focus on RoO. It will, in its own small way assist policy makers in 
decision making and contribute to the ever-increasing literature on rules of origin in FTAs. 
 
1.4 Aim of thesis  
Rules of origin are an important aspect of RTAs. They have played a central role in the 
negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTTA) and the European Union-
Southern Common Market (Mercosur).40 The Committee of Trade Agreements of the World 
Trade Organisation has elevated them to the status of a systemic negotiation issue.41 
                                                          
37 G Erasmus ‘The TFTA as a legal construct: What is it and how will it be implemented?’ 2017 tralac Trade 
Brief No. US17TB04/2017 available at https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/11497-the-tfta-as-a-legal-
construct-what-is-it-and-how-will-it-be-implemented.html accessed on 26 July 2017.  
38 Article 39(3) of the TFTA Agreement. 
39 F Mangeni ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area – a breakthrough in July 2017 as South Africa signs the Tripartite 
Agreement’ (10 July 2017) available at https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11860-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-
a-breakthrough-in-july-2017-as-south-africa-signs-the-tripartite-agreement.html accessed on 26 July 2017.  
40 A Estevadeordal & K Suominen ‘Rules of Origin in FTAs in Europe and in the Americas: Issues and 
Implications for the EU Mercosur Inter-regional agreement’ 2004 Intal ITD Working Paper 15 available at 
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/2568/Rules%20of%20Origin%20in%20FTAs%20in%20E
urope%20and%20in%20the%20Americas%3a%20Issues%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20EU-
Mercosur%20Inter-Regional%20Association%20Agreement.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed on 12 
August 2017.  
41 ‘The Doha Declaration Explained’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm accessed on 12 August 2017.  
7 
 
Negotiations and the legal scrubbing on Annex 4 on RoO in the TFTA Agreement have just 
recently been completed. More signatures and ratifications of the Agreement are expected to 
follow given that most of the outstanding issues in Phase 1 of the negotiations appear to have 
been dealt with.  
 
Against this background, the thesis aims to achieve the following. Firstly, the thesis seeks to 
identify the RoO regimes applicable in the three RECs forming the TFTA. This will be 
achieved by analysing the RoO that are employed by the different RECs in the TFTA. 
Secondly, the thesis will discuss the RoO applicable in the TFTA and the impact these RoO 
have on intra-regional trade and economic integration. Thirdly, the thesis examines the extent 
to which Annex 4 on RoO addresses the problem of restrictive or discriminatory RoO in the 
TFTA. In this regard, Annex 4 to the TFTA Agreement will be analysed and compared with 
the RoO regimes applicable in other multilateral FTAs, specifically the MERCOSUR and 
ASEAN FTA. The thesis will also evaluate whether the RoO that will apply in the TFTA hinder 
or promote regional integration efforts within the tripartite territory.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
The main research question this thesis seeks to answer is: To what extent do rules of origin in 
the TFTA hinder or promote regional economic integration?  
 
In addressing the above question, the following questions will also be answered; 
(i) How did Rules of Origin become part of the Multilateral Trade System and what role do 
they play? 
(ii) What rules of origin apply in the Southern Africa Development Community, The East 
African Community and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa? 
(iii) How do rules of origin in the TFTA compare to rules of origin of particular multilateral 
FTAs? To what extent will the rules of origin in the TFTA impact intra-regional trade 
and will they promote or hinder regional integration? 
 
1.6 Relevance of thesis 
 
The discussion of these questions could be of assistance to the role players involved in 
formulating RoO to apply in the TFTA. The research questions this thesis seeks to answer raise 
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topical issues that are relevant to Africa’s efforts at increasing intra-regional trade and 
economic integration. RoO in the tripartite territory have for a long time been a subject where 
divergent views have been expressed by the different countries within the region. As such, this 
thesis tackles this controversial and highly technical issue with the aim of offering solutions 
and recommendations to policy makers. The thesis also contributes to the ever-increasing 
literature on international trade in general and on RoO in particular. 
 
1.7 Research methodology 
 
This thesis will mainly be based on desktop and library research. The key primary sources to 
be explored are the Agreement Establishing the COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free 
Trade Area and its annexures, the SADC Trade Protocol, The COMESA Treaty, the EAC 
Treaty, the General Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT) and the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
(ARoO). Journal articles, textbooks and papers by prominent trade law and economic 
integration authors will form the secondary sources component of the research. Internet sources 
will also be utilised, as they constitute significant literature on issues pertaining to RoO in 
FTAs.  
 
The following approaches will be employed in this thesis. A descriptive approach will be 
utilised to give a general overview of the RoO applied in the COMESA, EAC and SADC blocs.  
An analytical approach will be employed to assess the impact of these RoO on intra-regional 
trade and the extent to which they promote or hinder regional integration.  A comparative 
analysis will be employed to draw similarities and differences between RoO in the TFTA and 
RoO in other multilateral FTAs.  
 
 
1.8 Literature Review 
 
International trade law by its very nature is a multidisciplinary subject in respect of which there 
is an ever-increasing literature. Of late, perhaps due to a lack of meaningful progress in WTO 
negotiations, there has been a proliferation of free trade agreements. Consequently, more 
authors have devoted their writing to the subject of regional and bilateral trade agreements. As 
Africa intensifies efforts at regional and economic integration, RoO have remained a topical 
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issue in the TFTA, a phenomenon that is also present in FTAs across the world. A review of 
some of the existing literature on FTAs and RoO is undertaken below. 
The liberalization of trade has been one of the foremost objectives of the WTO. Instruments 
such as the GATT have been directed towards the unification of multilateral trade by providing 
international rules on harmonisation of trade practice and the maximization of global 
cooperation. To this end, Article XXIV of the GATT allows the formation of customs unions 
and FTAs. According to Leon Trakman, the reasoning behind GATT’s endorsement of RTAs 
was that, ‘by reducing trade barriers between two or more members, the presupposed net result 
was the enhancement of global trade.’42 Trakman goes on to point that although ‘bilateral 
agreements are by their nature reciprocal, consensual and inclusive of the parties while being 
exclusionary of non-parties’, they are in practice ‘also internally different from one another.’43 
These internal differences in bilateral agreements are also evident in African RTAs, particularly 
in the context of RoO regimes in the TFTA. In this regard, Naumann observes that ‘while the 
majority [of RTAs in Africa] employ a broadly generic approach to determining the preferential 
origin status of traded goods, they are often substantially different in detail and application.’44 
He points out that different RoO regimes are applied in different RTAs often resulting in 
unnecessary RoO related trade barriers. This sentiment is also shared by Willem Viljoen, who 
argues that if non-uniform RoO apply in the three RECs forming the TFTA and ‘some countries 
apply different RoO to different countries, uncertainty, confusion and barriers to trade will 
increase rather than decrease.'45    
 
RoO themselves are an important component of international trade. According to Joseph 
LaNasa46, ‘[they] were designed as an uncontroversial, neutral device essential to 
implementing discriminatory trade policies, compiling economic statistics, and marking a 
good.’ The author argues that RoO become more important and more controversial as the extent 
to which similar goods from different countries or trading groups are accorded differential 
                                                          
42 E Trakman ‘The Proliferation of free Trade Agreements: Beauty or Bane?’ (2008) 42 (2) Journal of World 
Trade 367, 370. 
43 Ibid 373. 
44 Nauman (note 25 above). 
45 Viljoen (note 15 above) 9.  
46 LaNasa III, Joseph A ‘An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin and the Effectiveness of 
the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them’ 3 (Harvard Law 
School, The Jean Monnet Working Papers Series No.9601, 1996) available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/96/9601ind.html accessed on the 10th of August 2017.  
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treatment increases.47 He submits that as a result of a lack of global regulation of RoO and their 
effectiveness in protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, ‘governments [have] 
increasingly turned to rules of origin as a mechanism for protectionism.’48 Many authors also 
share this view point. Vermulst49 attributes the increasing importance of RoO in international 
trade to ‘the surge in selective contingency protectionist measures’. Hatem Mabrouk50 argues 
that despite their role and importance in international trade, ‘RoO are considered to be obstacles 
to international trade when they are used as protectionist apparatuses and when their stringency 
leads to trade diversion.’51 Brenton et al.52 argue that highly protectionist domestic industries 
heavily influence SADC RoO. They are of the view that ‘unnecessary use of a detailed product-
by-product approach to rules of origin is likely to lead to complex and restrictive rules of origin 
and to constrain integration.’53 To prevent the use of RoO as protectionist tools and 
consequently obstacles to trade, Article 2 (b) of the ARoO calls upon member states to ‘ensure 
that . . . rules of origin are not used as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or 
indirectly.’  
 
In the TFTA Annex 4 on RoO, one of the principles governing the application of RoO is that 
RoO ‘shall facilitate intra-regional trade and shall not create distortive or disruptive effects on 
regional trade.’54 According to Naumann55, the facilitation of preferential trade between 
preferential partners to the exclusion of goods simply transhipped from third countries is the 
main objective of a PTA such as the TFTA. In this regard, the design of an underlying RoO is 
critical to achieving this objective. According to him, the design, application, and 
implementation of preferential RoO is often the biggest challenge. He argues that ‘there is no 
common binding standard that would facilitate the design of “appropriate” RoO conforming 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 E Vermulst ‘Rules of Origin as commercial policy instruments -Revisited’ (1996) 26 (6) Journal of World 
Trade 61-102, 62. 
50 Mabrouk (note 29 above) 103. 
51 Trade diversion occurs when new RTA members seek products from existing RTA members, redirecting 
previous trade flows away from efficient external producers in non-member states to less efficient producers 
within the RTA, in accordance with the RTA conditions of membership. The use of RoO as protectionist 
devices used to protect industries in an RTA thus has the potential to lead to trade diversion. See Marceau & 
Reiman (note 165 below) 304.  
52 P Brenton et al ‘Rules of Origin and SADC: The Case for Change in the Midterm Review of the Trade 
Protocol’ (2005) 83 African Region Working Paper Series available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/267121468340272289/pdf/336090PAPER0wp83.pdf. Accessed on 
the 8th of August 2017.  
53 Ibid 13.  
54 Annex 4 on RoO, Article 2(b).  
55 Nauman (note 25 above) 2.   
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perhaps to some best practice standard.’56 He further notes that ‘given the inherent nature and 
far reaching implications of RoO and the range of different methodologies available to 
determine origin, there is arguably no obvious methodology that would satisfy all RoO 
objectives in an optimal manner.’57 
 
1.9 Limitations of the thesis 
 
A conclusive analysis of the impact of the RoO in the TFTA can hardly be achieved in this 
thesis owing to a number of reasons. Firstly, the TFTA is a work in progress, still very much 
in its infancy. The TFTA Agreement is yet to attain the requisite fourteen ratifications that will 
bring it into force, with Egypt being the only member state of the TFTA to have ratified the 
Agreement as of 4 August 2017. It therefore remains to be seen whether the recent conclusion 
of negotiations on the Annexes on rules of origin, trade remedies and dispute settlement will 
move member states to deposit their instruments of ratification. Even if that were to occur 
within the period in which this research is being conducted and the RoO in Annex 4 of the 
TFTA Agreement were to become applicable between member states of the TFTA, the 
challenge still remains to accurately and exhaustively assess the impact of these RoO on 
regional trade and economic integration in the tripartite territory as it may take years to collect 
the data required for such an assessment.  
 
Secondly, the RoO contained in Annex 4of the TFTA Agreement are, at the time of writing 
this thesis, yet to be finalised. Of particular importance is Appendix 1 to Annex 4 on RoO, 
which contains a schedule of products whose originating status is determined in accordance 
with Article 5(2) of Annex 4 on RoO. This product list is yet to be completed and is not included 
in the current Annex 4 on RoO. As such, a product-by-product analysis of the RoO applicable 
in the TFTA is not possible. Likewise, the comparison of RoO in the TFTA vis-à-vis RoO in 
Mercosur and the ASEAN FTA is confined to origin determining provisions and does not 
include RoO that apply to specific products. 
 
Lastly, the time and space available to the researcher does not permit for a detailed article-by-
article analysis of the RoO as they are presented in Annex 4 on RoO in the TFTA. 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid 3. 
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Consequently, only the provisions in Annex 4 on RoO that deal with origin determination will 
be identified and will receive the utmost consideration.  
 
 
 
Chapter Breakdown 
 
Chapter 1 
Chapter one of the dissertation will deal with the following 
- Background of the research 
- Statement of purpose 
- Rationale for the thesis 
- Research questions 
- Literature review 
- Research methodology 
- Limitations of research 
 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter focuses solely on RoO in the Multilateral Trade System.   
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter three discusses RoO that apply in the Southern Africa Development Community, The 
East African Community and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa? 
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter four deals with a comparison of RoO in the TFTA vis-à-vis RoO in the Mercosur and 
ASEAN FTAs particular and an assessment of the extent to which RoO in the TFTA impact 
intra-regional trade and whether they will promote or hinder regional integration? 
 
Chapter 5  
This is the last chapter and it discusses the findings of the thesis, proffers recommendations to 
policy makers and discusses the conclusions drawn from the research conducted.  
 
13 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Rules of Origin in the Multilateral Trade System 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The multilateral trading system today is an intricate web of preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). Crucial to the operation and success of these PTAs are the rules that determine the 
origin of goods that are traded between the parties to these agreements, commonly referred to 
as rules of origin (RoO). RoO are an indispensable component of international trade 
agreements.58 They are used to determine the economic origin of goods in international trade. 
According to Kruger, RoO specify the criteria under which goods ‘imported by one CU 
[customs union] or FTA partner will be deemed to have originated from within the CU or FTA 
and thus be eligible for duty free treatment.’59 Their function 
 is to prevent trade deflection wherein non-originating goods are shipped to a party to a 
free trade agreement with the lowest external tariffs and then re-exported to the party 
with higher tariffs in order to avoid paying these higher tariffs or products originating 
from non-beneficiaries of unilateral preferential schemes are trans-shipped through 
beneficiary countries.60 
Against this background, this chapter seeks to determine how RoO became part of the 
multilateral trading system and exactly what role they play in international trade. In this regard 
therefore, the chapter will provide a background on RoO, discuss the legislative texts governing 
RoO in international trade and conclude with a brief discussion on the current problems facing 
RoO in the multilateral trading system. 
 
 
                                                          
58 J Coyle ‘Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing 
Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement’ 2004 (29) 2 Yale Journal of International Law 545-580, 
547. 
59 A Kruger ‘Free trade agreements as protectionist devices: Rules of Origin’ April 1993 NBER Working Paper 
Series Working Paper No. 4352, 5 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4352. See also Gretton and Jali 
(note 406 below) 1.  
60 ‘RoO applicable to exports from LDCs’ UNCTAD, United Nations 2011, 2 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctncd20094_en.pdf accessed on 6 September 2017. See also Lombaerde & Garay 
(note 260 below) 954, for the view that RoO are meant to prevent the proliferation of the phenomenon known as 
trade deflection.   
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2.1.1 Background on RoO 
RoO have for a very long time been part of the world trading system. They can basically be 
defined as ‘those laws, regulations, and practices that govern the determination of the country 
of origin of an imported product.61  Two types of RoO exist in the multilateral trading system 
(these are non-preferential RoO and preferential RoO).62 Non-preferential RoO ‘are used to 
distinguish foreign from domestic products in establishing anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties, safeguard measures, origin marking requirements and in the context of government 
procurement’.63 Preferential RoO on the other hand ‘define the conditions under which the 
importing country will regard a product as originating in an exporting country that receives 
preferential treatment from the importing country.’64 As such, non-preferential RoO are mainly 
concerned with administrative issues such as the recording of trade statistics whereas 
preferential RoO determine whether a particular product will enjoy certain tariff preferences 
based on the fulfilment of a certain criteria classifying its origin. 
According to LaNasa, RoO were initially designed ‘as an uncontroversial, neutral device 
essential to implementing discriminatory trade policies,65 compiling economic statistics, and 
marking a good.’66 In this context therefore, RoO remained uncontroversial and neutral devices 
‘for as long as the parts of a product were manufactured and assembled primarily in one 
country, and as long as other mechanisms for implementing protectionism67 existed.’68 With 
the growth of industrialization and the surge in multinational corporations, goods began to be 
produced in multiple stages using components manufactured in different places across the 
world. This in turn undoubtedly created difficulties in establishing what constitutes an 
                                                          
61 D Palmeter ‘Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction? A commentary on the new form of protectionism’ 
(1987) 11 (1) Fordham International Law Journal 1-50, 2. 
62 A Estevadeordal & K Suominen ‘Mapping and measuring Rules of Origin around the world’ in Cadot et al 
(eds) The origin of goods: Rules of origin in Regional Trade Agreements New York: Oxford University Press 
(2006), 72. 
63 Ibid 73. 
64 Ibid  
65 Discriminatory trade policies include policies such as anti-dumping measures and safeguard laws. Anti-
dumping measures involve the charging of extra import duties on particular goods from particular exporting 
countries so as to remove any injury to the domestic industry in the importing country. Safeguard laws are 
meant to protect domestic industries from a surge of imports from a particular country.  
66 LaNasa (note 46 above) 3.  
67 Protectionism refers to the theory or practice of protecting domestic industries and local jobs from foreign 
competition through government actions or policies that restrict or restrain international trade. Such actions and 
policies involve the imposition of tariffs on imported goods, restrictive quotas, product standards, and 
government subsidies. See ‘What is protectionism’ available at 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/protectionism.asp accessed on 12 August 2017. 
68 LaNasa (note 46 above) 3.  
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originating product.69 Governments seemingly did not like the idea of a product manufactured 
entirely in one country then shipped to another country where it underwent little transformation 
to be accorded origin status of the latter country. An extract of a speech made by the Australian 
Minister for Trade and Customs in the Australian House of Representatives whilst introducing 
the Customs Bill of 1925 best illustrates this point: 
An almost ludicrous state of affairs has arisen. Textile goods manufactured entirely on 
the Continent of Europe have been sent to England, and there dyed, measured, and 
wrapped, and have then come to this country under the terms of British preference. 
Machines in parts have been made on the Continent, and assembled and packed in 
England, and have come here under the terms of British. I am sorry to say that there is 
in England a type of Anglo-continental manufacturer, and he should be prevented from 
doing this sort of thing.70 
Against this background, origin as a concept had to be defined. Defining origin as a concept 
became even more important ‘as the major trading nations entered into special arrangements 
resulting in different tariffs with certain countries.’71  
The earliest effort directed at standardizing origin was in the 1923 International Convention 
Relating to Simplification of Customs Formalities.72 The provisions of this convention allowed 
the contracting states ‘to delegate or out-source the process of origin certification to third party 
organizations of their choice.’73 When GATT came into force in 1947, it did not deal with RoO, 
but rather gave the contracting states the freedom to determine their own RoO.74  
                                                          
69 A Zampetti & P Sauve ‘Rules of Origin for services: economic and legal considerations’ in Cadot et al (eds) 
The origin of goods: Rules of origin in Regional Trade Agreements New York: Oxford University Press (2006), 
73.  
70 An extract from the Speech delivered by the Honourable Mr. M. Pratten, Australian Minister for Trade and 
Customs, in the Australian House of Representatives at the introduction of the Customs Bill 1925. Available at 
https://historichansard.net/hofreps/1925/19250821_reps_9_111/#debate-18. Accessed on the 28th of August 
2016.  
71 J Bourgeois ‘Rules of Origin: An Introduction’ in Vermulst et al (eds) Rules of Origin in International Trade: 
A Comparative Study. Michigan: University of Michigan Press (1994). 
72 International Convention Relating to Simplification of Customs Formalities, 1923. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2030/v30.pdf 371. Accessed on the 28th of August 
2017.   
73 ‘RoO applicable to exports from LDCs’ (note 60 above). Article 11 of the 1923 International Convention 
Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities provided that origin certificates could be issued not only 
by official authorities of the contracting states but also by any other organisation with the necessary authority 
and previously approved for this purpose by the states concerned.     
74 J Jackson ‘World trade and the Law of GATT: A legal analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade’ Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, (1969) 468. 
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In 1953, however, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) submitted a proposal to 
GATT contracting parties for the adoption of a uniform definition for determining the 
nationality of manufactured goods.75 GATT did not adopt the proposal due to ‘[differing] views 
between those countries that view[ed] rules of origins as instruments of commercial policy and 
those which view[ed] them as technical, objective, and neutral instruments.’76 Although GATT 
did undertake several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations aimed at eliminating tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade, RoO never featured prominently in these negotiations until the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1986. The following section provides a brief history of 
GATT and the multilateral trade negotiations that led up to the Uruguay Round.  
 
2.2 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1947 (GATT) 
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1947, which entered into force in 1948 ‘sets the 
rules for international trade and provides a forum for multilateral trade negotiations.’77 
Commonly referred to as GATT, ‘it is often described as the major international treaty 
discipline for world trade’78 and ‘one of the principal international organizations concerned 
with the substantive issues of international trade policy.’79 GATT was created in the aftermath 
of World War II. Its emergence can be traced back to 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
when delegates from twenty-three countries, led by the US and the UK, met to devise a post-
war economic and financial recovery plan.80 There existed a strong desire among the main 
Western economic powerhouses such as the US and the UK, for multilateral co-operation in 
international trade policy.81 There was a general conviction that the economic troubles of the 
1930s, characterised by widespread protectionism, and the devastating war that ensued were 
                                                          
75 LaNasa (note 46 above) 3.  
76 Ibid.  
77 ‘Gist: GATT and the International Trading System’ (1992) 3 (5) Department of State Dispatch 22-23, 22. 
78 J Jackson ‘GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions’ (1992) 18 (1) Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 11-30, 15. 
79 D McRae & J Thomas ‘The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo Round’ 1983 (77) American 
Journal of International Law 51 – 83, 52. 
80 Jackson (note 74 above) 15; See also Jackson (note 151 below) 5. 
81 J McKinney ‘The World Trade Regime: Past Successes and Future Challenges’ (1994) 49 International 
Journal 445-471, 445. 
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connected. To avoid a repetition of the economic decline and political turmoil, it was thought 
necessary to establish a stable international political and economic structure.82  
The vision was to put in place three international economic institutions, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organisation (ITO). The task 
of establishing the World Bank and the IMF was done quicker than that of establishing the 
ITO. With the intention to expedite negotiations on tariff reductions and their implementation, 
the GATT was slotted in “to serve as an interim agreement until the ITO and its founding 
document, the Havana Charter, could be approved by national legislatures.”83 In this regard 
therefore the drafters of GATT never intended it to operate on a permanent basis. Instead, it 
was the Havana Charter, which was a more detailed and complete document than GATT and 
‘contained provisions relating to employment, economic development, restrictive business 
practices, and dispute resolution,’84 that was intended to operate as the founding document to 
the ITO.85 However, when it became clear that the Havana Charter would never enter into force 
when the US Congress failed to ratify it, GATT was used to fill the vacuum created by the 
demise of the Havana Charter.86  
The main objectives pursued by the countries in GATT were the raising of standards of living, 
developing full use of world resources, and expanding the production and exchange of goods.87 
To fulfil these objectives, they entered into ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.’88  
 
                                                          
82 G Bunting ‘GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical Perspective’ (1996) 11 St. 
John's Journal of Legal Commentary 505-522, 522. For more detailed background information on the GATT, 
see Jackson (note 74 above) 35-57. 
83 K Kennedy ‘The GATT-WTO System at Fifty’ (1997)16 Wisconsin International Law Journal 421-528, 422.   
84 Ibid. 
85 See Article XXIX of GATT which provides:  
1. The contracting parties undertake to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority the 
general principles of Chapters I to VI inclusive and of Chapter IX of the Havana Charter pending their 
acceptance of it in accordance with their constitutional procedures.  
2. Part II of this Agreement shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into 
force. 
3. If by September 30, 1949, the Havana Charter has not entered into force, the contracting parties shall 
meet before December 31, 1949, to agree whether this Agreement shall be amended, supplemented, or 
maintained. 
86 Jackson (note 74 above) 17. 
87 GATT Preamble. 
88 Ibid. 
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2.2.1 GATT Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Apart from liberalizing trade, the GATT also provided a platform for further multilateral trade 
negotiations.89 As more countries acceded to the GATT, further trade liberalization 
negotiations ensued. The first of these negotiations was the Geneva Round of Multilateral 
Trade negotiations, which started in April 1947. Reportedly, 23 Countries participated in the 
Geneva round and apparently, it was here that the GATT was brought to life. Further, 
negotiations at the 1947 Geneva round were mainly centred on trade liberalisation through the 
elimination of tariffs and 45000 tariff concessions covering more than $10 billion worth of 
trade were exchanged.90   
The second and third rounds of trade negotiations were the Annecy and the Torquay rounds 
which took place between 1949 and 1950-1951 respectively. During these rounds, GATT 
membership increased but there was little progress in the reduction of tariffs.91 The fourth 
round of negotiations returned to Geneva in 1955-1956 and 22 countries participated in the 
1955-56 Geneva Round. The USA, the UK, France, and Germany led the countries that 
participated at the 1955-56 Geneva round.92 They managed to negotiate tariff reductions worth 
$2.5 billion in trade value.93  
The fifth round of trade negotiations was again held in Geneva between 1960-1962 and it was 
named the Dillon Round, after the then U.S. Treasury Secretary and former Under Secretary 
of State, Douglas Dillon, who first initially proposed the talks.94 The Dillon Round focused on 
harmonizing concessions within the newly established European Economic Community 
(EEC). Reportedly, 4 400 concessions covering $4.9 billion worth of trade were negotiated.95   
In 1964, GATT members met in Geneva for the sixth round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
the Kennedy Round, named after assassinated US President John Kennedy. This round of 
negotiations was, upon its conclusion, hailed ‘as the most important trade and tariff negotiation 
                                                          
89 Gist (note 77 above). 
90 ‘The GATT years: From Havana to Marrakesh’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 8 September 2017.     
91 D Irwin ‘The GATT in historical perspective’ (1995) 85 The American Economic Review 323-328, 325.  
92 See ‘Geneva round’ https://prezi.com/qwun6ccqigip/the-gatt-geneva-round-of-negotiations-1955-1956/. 
Accessed on 8 September 2017 
93 Ibid.   
94 ‘History of GATT rounds’ available at https://www.joc.com/history-gatt-rounds_19931214.html accessed on 
8 September 2017.   
95 Ibid.  
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ever held.’96 Among its main objectives were the establishment of ‘acceptable conditions of 
access to world markets for agricultural, as well as for industrial products’, the inclusion of 
non-tariff barriers in the negotiations and the reduction of barriers to the exports of less 
developed countries without the expectation of full reciprocity from these countries.97   
The Kennedy Round saw the involvement of developing countries which had largely been side-
lined in the previous rounds of GATT negotiations. It was also generally successful in tariff 
reduction with $40 billion in tariffs being eliminated.98 Of concern, the US tariff concessions 
at the Kennedy round increased in scope and depth compared to other multilateral trade 
negotiations, totalling $8 billion.99 In relation to non-tariff barriers, the Kennedy Round had 
limited success although it led to the adoption of the Anti-Dumping Code, which provided 
more clarity on the application of Article VI of GATT. 100  
The seventh round of multilateral trade negotiations was the Tokyo Round held in Tokyo from 
1973 to 1979. It was the longest round of negotiations since the formation of GATT and 102 
countries took part in the negotiations. It permitted even countries that were not signatories to 
the GATT to participate in the negotiations.101  The inclusion of countries that were not 
signatories to the GATT in the negotiations can be attributed to the objectives of the 
negotiations, which aimed to ‘achieve the expansion and ever greater liberalization of world 
trade’, ‘secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries’, and the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers or the reduction of their trade restricting or distortion 
effects.102 There was wide recognition of the fact that non-tariff barriers presented an even 
greater obstacle to trade liberalization than tariffs. While the previous rounds of GATT 
negotiations had been successful in reducing tariffs, non-tariff barriers had begun to emerge as 
substitute instruments of protectionism.103 The Tokyo Round therefore presented the 
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negotiating countries with an opportunity to conclude multilateral trade instruments that would 
regulate the use of non-tariff measures. 104  
As such, the Tokyo Round employed the same approach that had been used in the Kennedy 
Round tariff negotiations which ‘involved general agreement on a tariff negotiating formula, a 
matter on which there could be multilateral negotiations, with the possibility of resort to the 
bilateral request-and-offer procedure for dealing with exceptions to the agreed formula.’ Since 
the focus of the Tokyo Round was non-tariff barriers, the negotiating countries had very little 
experience in this regard as previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations had focused on 
tariff barriers. Resultantly, there was no clear negotiating procedure to follow.105  
Continuing with the GATT’s primary goal of tariff reduction, the industrialised countries 
agreed to reduce tariffs by almost one-third over a period of eight years. The Tokyo Round also 
made some progress in dealing with non-tariff barriers. Various codes of conduct were agreed 
upon ‘dealing with subsidies and countervailing duties, custom valuation, government 
procurement, import licensing and technical barriers to trade.’106  
 
2.2.2 Why were RoO never discussed at GATT? 
As mentioned earlier, the earlier rounds of GATT multilateral trade negotiations from 1947 to 
1979 did not address directly the issue of RoO. Although there was a shift in focus from tariff 
reduction to the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade in the Kennedy and the Tokyo rounds, 
none of these rounds included negotiations on RoO. RoO were among the non-tariff measures 
that were considered to be ‘too complex or controversial to be addressed through general rules 
or “codes of conduct” alone.’107 In GATT, it was origin markings (rather than RoO) that 
received more attention and were dealt with in Article IX of GATT.108 Concerning RoO, the 
GATT Preparatory Committee during the second session in 1947, decided that ‘it is within the 
province of each importing member to determine, in accordance with the provisions of its law, 
for the purpose of applying the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle109 whether goods do in 
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fact originate in a particular country.’110 This position is attributed to the GATT drafter’s pre-
occupation with establishing the MFN clause in article 1 of GATT.111   
2.2.3 The Kyoto Convention 
The first multilateral attempt at harmonization of RoO was in the Kyoto Convention 112 in 
1973, which sought to harmonize both preferential and non-preferential RoO through the 
adoption of guidelines based on the principles of ‘wholly produced’ and ‘substantial 
transformation’ that countries would use in their RoO.113 The wholly produced or obtained 
category, which accordingly applies only to one PTA member, ‘asks whether the commodities 
and related products have been entirely grown, harvested, or extracted from the soil in the 
territory of that member or manufactured there from any of these products.’114 The criteria for 
substantial transformation is more complex involving goods manufactured with inputs from 
different countries or regions. In this regard, the question is whether the manufacturing or 
processing which the inputs undergo results in a change so significant such that it can be said 
that the resultant product was produced in the country where such change took place.115 
However, under the Kyoto Convention, as was the case under the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) proposal, ‘member countries retained a great deal of discretion to fashion the 
rules of origin as they deemed fit.’116 The Kyoto Convention did not achieve much success in 
getting countries to sign the convention117 although the ‘convention's rule of origin for goods 
wholly obtained in the originating country has been adopted repeatedly by other trade 
agreements.’118 
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2.2.4 The Uruguay Round and the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
The Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1993, was the eighth round of GATT 
multilateral negotiations and ‘by far the most ambitious round of negotiations.’119 The agenda 
at the Uruguay round included, among other things, the extension of the scope of GATT to 
include trade in services, protection of intellectual property, trade related investment measures 
and the improvement of existing GATT rules.120 The round also pushed for further tariff 
reductions and improvements on the non-tariff codes that had been negotiated in the previous 
rounds.121 Following the little success of the several attempts at harmonizing the widely 
different RoO, the harmonisation of RoO also featured prominently on the agenda of the 
Uruguay Round.122 
On 15 April 1994, after eight years of negotiations, the participating countries signed The Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at 
Marrakesh, Morocco.123 This document is mainly made up of five separate agreements:  
 the Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement); 
 the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Trade and Goods; 
 the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(Dispute Settlement Understanding); 
 the Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and  
 the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.124  
It also consists of several ministerial decisions and declarations, which are appended to the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.125 Among the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Trade and 
Goods, contained in Annex 1A, is the Agreement on RoO.126  
                                                          
119 McKinney (note 81 above) 449. 
120 J Bello & M Footer ‘Uruguay Round - GATT/WTO – Preface’ (1995) 29 (2) International Lawyer 335-344, 
336. 
121 McKinney (note 81 above) 449. 
122 W Leirer ‘Rules of Origin under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the ACP-EEC Lome IV Convention and 
Their Compatibility with the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin’ (1995) 16 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 483-526, 485.  
123 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867/volume-1867-I-31874-English.pdf  accessed on 
7 September 2017. 
124 W Aceves ‘Lost Sovereignty - The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements’ (1995) 19 Fordham 
International Law Journal 427-474, 431. 
125 D Leebron ‘An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results’ (1996) 34 (11) Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 11-36, 12. 
126 ARoO (note 17 above).  
23 
 
The Agreement on RoO was an attempt to regulate and harmonise the RoO used by the 
signatory states127 ‘to ensure that RoO themselves do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade.’128 The Agreement on RoO was formed in order to ensure that member states of the 
WTO comply with a set of harmonised RoO when specifying the origin of a product in the 
application of the MFN principle:  
under Articles I, II, III, XI and XIII of GATT 1994; anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties under Article VI of GATT 1994; safeguard measures under Article XIX of 
GATT 1994; origin marking requirements under Article IX of GATT 1994 and for 
government procurement and trade statistics.129  
Further, Article 1.1 of the ARoO defines non-preferential RoO as ‘those laws, regulations and 
administrative determinations of general application applied by any Member to determine the 
country of origin of goods.’130  
According to LaNasa, non-preferential RoO ‘are used for all other purposes, including 
enforcement of product and country specific trade restrictions that increase the cost of entry 
(i.e., antidumping duties) or restrict or prevent market entry (i.e., quotas).’131 In addition, non 
– preferential RoO are also used for origin marking or labelling and are otherwise mainly 
important for the collection of trade statistics.132  
As such, Article 1(1) expressly excludes RoO ‘related to contractual or autonomous trade 
regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the application of the [MFN 
clause].’ The effect of this provision is that ‘when harmonised, non-preferential RoO, would 
not apply in PTAs.’133 The Agreement on RoO however does contain in Annex II, a Common 
Declaration with regard to Preferential Rules of Origin134, which ‘seeks to provide more 
transparency and foster the development of a rule of law around the application of the 
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preferential rules through the adoption of suggested procedural reforms.’135 The Common 
Declaration defines preferential RoO as: 
 those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application 
applied by any Member to determine whether goods qualify for preferential treatment 
under contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff 
preferences going beyond the application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994.136  
The use of preferential RoO is therefore an exception to the MFN principle in Article 1 of 
GATT in so far as it affords preferential treatment to goods originating from member states of 
a preferential agreement whilst not extending such preferential treatment to similar goods 
originating from countries who are not member states of the preferential agreement.  
Further, Article 4 (1) of the Agreement on RoO established a Committee on Rules of Origin 
(CRO) whose main purpose is to facilitate consultation on matters relating to the operation of 
parts I to IV of the Agreement. In addition, it aims to ensure the furtherance of the objectives 
set out in these parts and carrying out any other responsibilities assigned to it under the 
Agreement or by the Council for Trade in Goods. A Technical Committee on RoO (TCRO) 
was established in Article 4(2), under the auspices of the World Customs Organization 
(WCO)137 (formerly Customs Co-operation Council) and tasked with carrying out the 
Harmonisation Work Programme (HWP)138 in accordance with part IV and Annex I of the 
Agreement.139   
In terms of Article 9(1) (b), the ‘wholly obtained’ and the ‘substantial transformation’ criteria 
are used to define origin under the harmonised rules. Furthermore, the TCRO developed a 
harmonized list of ‘minimal operations or processes that do not by themselves confer origin to 
a good.’140 In defining the ‘substantial transformation’ criteria for goods produced in more than 
one country, the TCRO uses:  
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the change in tariff classification method at the heading or sub-heading level, using the 
Harmonized System as the underlying nomenclature, and, when supplemental tests are 
necessary…the value added and specified processing methods of determining origin.141  
In this regard therefore, the HWP seeks to have a uniform application of the criteria that is used 
to determine the origin of goods. 
The HWP was projected to be completed in three years from the date of its commencement.142 
Provision was made for a set of principles to be followed before and after the three years during 
which the RoO were to be drafted and adopted.143 Member states were to ensure, among other 
things, that: 
-  ‘rules of origin are not used as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or 
indirectly’;  
- ‘rules of origin shall not themselves create restrictive, distorting, or disruptive effects 
on international trade’; and  
- ‘that their rules of origin are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner.’144  
 
As discussed above,145 progress in the HWP negotiations have stalled due to a failure on WTO 
members to reconcile their different positions on the issue of RoO. 
 
2.2.5 From GATT to WTO 
One of the most significant developments to emerge from the Uruguay Round was the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).146 The emergence of the WTO can be 
attributed to the institutional weaknesses of GATT as a system. Although the GATT system 
was a huge success in trade liberalisation and elimination of tariffs, it had its own institutional 
problems. Among these problems was the fact that as mentioned earlier, the chief drafters of 
the GATT never intended it to operate on its own.147 It had been hoped that by the time the 
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drafting of the GATT would be completed, an International Trade Organisation (ITO) would 
be in place which would ‘provide the commitments and institutional structure for voting, rules 
of procedure, a secretariat, and detailed dispute settlement arrangements that are a normal part 
of an international organization.’148 The GATT was therefore meant to be an agreement that 
would operate under the ITO.  
Thus, with the expectation that a formal legal arrangement was to be concluded in the future, 
the contracting parties to the GATT agreed to commit to the obligations of the GATT under a 
Protocol of Provisional Application.149 150 This Protocol put GATT into operation as an 
international legal instrument.151  This provisional application of the GATT was yet another of 
its institutional problems, described as ‘confusing to the public and experts alike’ and also 
involving ‘the so-called "grandfather rights" of existing legislation, which were the subject of 
the rankest debate.’152 Another institutional problem was the amending provisions of GATT, 
which were regarded as inadequate. The general feeling was that the GATT was difficult to 
amend, which resulted in the establishment of a series of separate treaty agreements, which 
added to the complexity of the GATT system and ‘rendered the GATT vulnerable to the charge 
that it was an "a la carte" system, which reduced the predictability and uniformity of obligations 
among nations.’153  
The lack of a binding dispute resolution system also contributed to the problems of GATT. The 
GATT system had operated ‘as more or less an organization through which parties resolved 
their bilateral trade disputes by negotiation’ rendering it ‘more of a political forum than an 
adjudicatory one.’154 The United States had in recent times pushed for ‘a more legalistic dispute 
resolution system that would adjudge trade disputes according to an established, but evolving 
body of international trade law.’155  
As a result of these institutional weaknesses there was a proposal for the establishment of an 
umbrella organization ‘to be called either the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), or World 
                                                          
148 Ibid. 
149 The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for 
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/prov_appl_gen_agree_e.pdf accessed on 23 August 
2017. 
150  Patterson & Patterson (note 147 above) 6 
151 J Jackson ‘GATT and recent international trade problems’ (1987) 11 Maryland Journal of International Law 
and Trade 1-13, 8. 
152 Jackson (note 74 above) 18.  
153 Ibid.  
154 Bunting (note 82 above) 522. 
155 Ibid.  
27 
 
Trade Organization (WTO), devoted entirely to defining an institutional structure; establishing 
and reaffirming the treaty base of the GATT.’156 This proposal led to the creation of the WTO. 
Upon its creation, the WTO acquired an international personality and: 
serves as an umbrella organization for three multilateral agreements that are binding on 
all WTO members: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994157), the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).158  
 
2.2.6 Article XXIV of GATT 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is GATT Article XXIV, which is an exception to the 
principle of non-discrimination (MFN principle) embodied in Article I. Article XXIV: 
recognises the desirability of forming close economic integration in the form of customs 
unions and free trade areas (RTAs) as a means of increasing the freedom of trade 
between parties to the RTA and thereby contributing to the expansion of world trade.159  
According to Jackson, ‘[t]he basic policy goal of this provision is to permit preferential trading 
arrangements if they constitute a genuine attempt to develop free trade within the bloc.’160 As 
such, Article XXIV is probably the most contentious provision of the GATT.161 Many authors 
have been critical of this provision.162 It has also been viewed ‘as inadequate for today’s 
developing economic practices’ due to, for example, its failure to deal with the important 
question of RoO whilst a former GATT Deputy Director General complained that, ‘of all the 
GATT articles, this is one of the most abused, and those abuses are among the least noted.’163 
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To assist in the interpretation of this contentious provision, the negotiators at the Uruguay 
round of multilateral negotiations came up with the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of GATT 164 (the Understanding).165 The Understanding, among other things, 
provides that: 
 the review process of Article XXIV does not insulate RTAs from the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU); includes specific details of how RTAs must measure 
trade so as to be in compliance with Article XXIV; provides a timetable during which 
new emerging RTAs must be phased into operation; and creates a Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) whose main role is ‘to engage in oversight of 
RTAs and their relationship with the WTO.’ 166  
The Understanding has however been criticised as being ‘essentially technical and has not 
really altered the relationship of RTAs to the multilateral trading system.’167 Furthermore, the 
Understanding and the CRTA examination report process have proven to be ineffective in 
ensuring RTA compliance with the provisions of Article XXIV.168 
Notwithstanding the criticism directed at it, Article XXIV has led to the proliferation of RTAs. 
This is made possible by the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which recognises that: 
the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories.169  
The Understanding provides that in order to be consistent with Article XXIV, CU’s and FTAs 
and the agreements leading to their formation must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of 
paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.170 The basic premise of the provisions of Article XXIV 
is that GATT allows the formation of PTAs ‘but only as a reward for fully fledged liberalisation 
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in the form of either a CU or a FTA among the constituent members.’171 In terms of paragraph 
5(c), the PTA must take the form of a CU or an FTA within the interim phase in order to comply 
with Article XXIV contemplated in Article 5(c). 
 
2.2.7 Article XXIV and RoO 
The perceived relationship between Article XXIV and RoO stems from the wording of Article 
XXIV:5(b).172 This perceived relationship is based on the use of the words ‘other regulations 
of commerce’ and various views have been expressed on whether RoO are ‘regulations of 
commerce’ within the meaning of the provision. As a starting point one can look to the 
interpretation afforded the words ‘regulations of commerce’ by the WTO. In this regard, Islam 
and Alam note that the Panel in Turkey – Textiles173: 
 
determined that “any regulation of commerce having an impact on trade” could be taken 
to be as other regulation of commerce, and arguably preferential ROOs because of their 
significant potential impact on actual trade flows should also fall into the category.174 
 
In support of this viewpoint, the authors argue that the ARoO links RoO to trade measures and 
demonstrates a possible connection between RoO in PTA’s and ‘other regulations of 
commerce.’175 According to their argument, the link lies in the preamble of the ARoO, which 
‘[recognises] that clear and predictable rules of origin and their application facilitate the flow 
of international trade’ and which further states the desirability of ensuring ‘that rules of origin 
themselves do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade’ and also in paragraph 3(c) of the 
Common Declaration which requires that laws and regulations relating to preferential ROOs 
be published ‘as if they were subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Article X of 
GATT 1994’.176 Given that Article XXIV seeks to prohibit the use of restrictive ‘regulations 
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of commerce’ in FTAs, Rivas177 argues that there are incidents when RoO can indeed qualify 
as additional restrictions under Article XXIV:5 as they can have a ‘detrimental knock-on effect 
on external trade.’ This view is perhaps premised on the fact that in order to reap benefits from 
preferential treatment, producers within a PTA would naturally tend to increase local sourcing, 
thereby negatively impacts suppliers of third parties irrespective of their efficiency.  
 
However, a contrary view point argues that RoO in a PTA are concerned only with intra-PTA 
trade and determine the eligibility for the preferences granted by it, and in this sense therefore, 
‘they do not fall within the category of “other regulations of commerce” in terms of external 
trade of the PTA.’178 In this regard, Mathis179 argues that given that RoO in an RTA apply only 
to internal trade among RTA partners and do not extend to external trade between RTA partners 
and third parties, RoO therefore do not fall under the purview of Article XXIV:5. Further 
support for this position can be drawn from Hijazi who states that: 
 
[RoO in FTAs] while undoubtedly regulations of commerce, by definition cannot affect 
external trade in a way that Article XXIV:5 aims to proscribe, because they affect only 
internal trade between RTA partners. Effects of external trade, while potentially 
important, are indirect and a necessary and logical consequence of the liberalization of 
trade among RTA partners, and hence sanctioned by Article XXIV.180 
 
This thesis agrees with Mathis and Hijazi, and adopts the position that although RoO in RTAs 
can be regarded as ‘regulations of commerce’ they are not necessarily forbidden by Article 
XXIV as they apply only to internal trade among members of the RTA and thus do not fall 
under ‘regulations of commerce’ as contemplated under Article XXIV.  
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2.3 Current problems with RoO  
The changing needs of international trade have led to inevitable complexity in the concept of 
origin, ‘which has made the mere notion of substantial transformation obsolete.’181 In today’s 
trading system, products are rarely wholly produced in one country as parts, components, and 
manufacturing processes originate in different countries, with different levels of participation. 
As such, establishing origin has become an even tougher task.  
Different preferential trade arrangements, apply different RoO resulting in a lack of uniformity 
in RoO applied across the world. For example, although RoO regimes applied in the European 
Union (EU) FTAs are highly uniform vis-à-vis each other, there is much variation across RoO 
regimes in the Americas.182  
Although the HWP program has sought to harmonise non-preferential RoO the process has 
been long and drawn out due to failure to reach consensus on core policy issues that affect tariff 
headings. Since July 1998, which was the initially scheduled date for completion, of the 
program, the deadline has been extended several times.183  Even though the work of the TCRO 
was completed in 1999, interestingly, there were 500 pending issues that could not be solved 
at the technical level which were sent to the CRO in Geneva.184  
As such, RoO that are ‘overly detailed’ have been criticised as ‘obstructing rather than 
facilitating trade’ whilst on the other hand it is feared that “oversimplification may lead to 
ineffective rules.”185 RoO in some FTAs are complex and have often been used as protectionist 
devices. Typical examples are SADC and NAFTA RoO which are both known to be complex 
and are highly protective of their respective automobile industries.186 The failure of WTO 
members to conclude the HWP is evidence of their willingness “to use RoO as tools that protect 
their own national interests and susceptible goods.”187   
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2.4  Conclusion 
RoO play a critical role in the multilateral trade system. They are an important and 
indispensable component of international trade. In FTAs, preferential RoO are more useful 
than non-preferential RoO as they determine the preferential treatment accorded to goods 
originating from member states of the FTA. Primarily used to prevent the phenomenon known 
as trade deflection, preferential RoO however often fall prey to governments who tend to use 
them to pursue protectionist policies. In these instances, instead of being simple, predictable 
transparent and trade facilitating, RoO have been formulated in such a manner that they are 
complex, lack transparency and are restrictive of intra-regional trade.  
The lack of an international concerted effort aimed at harmonising preferential RoO is 
testimony to the difficulties that policy makers encounter in trying to obtain common ground 
on preferential RoO among member states of the WTO. This difficulty in reaching consensus 
on preferential RoO among WTO members can be attributed to the proliferation of RTAs 
which require different RoO regimes based on the specific needs of the RTA member countries. 
It is thus unsurprising that the three RECs making up the TFTA employ different RoO regimes 
that are tailored to meet the specific needs of their member countries. The following chapter 
focuses on RoO in the COMESA, SADC and EAC RECs, the three constituent RECs making 
up the TFTA. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RULES OF ORIGIN IN THE COMESA, EAC AND SADC RECs 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The TFTA is anchored on three core pillars: market integration, infrastructure development, 
and industrial development.188 The inclusion of the infrastructure development pillar and the 
industrialisation pillar provides an opportunity for the development of an integration agenda 
that not only focuses on obstacles at national points of entry but, more importantly, on the 
behind-the-border challenges to industrial development and competitiveness.189 Market 
integration, which involves the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the 
implementation of measures aimed at trade facilitation, is essential to the well-functioning of 
the TFTA.190 The constituent RECs of the TFTA, COMESA, EAC and SADC have achieved 
relative success in tariff liberalisation and this can be used as an effective launch pad for 
liberalisation of trade in goods in the TFTA. It is in the context of liberalisation of trade in 
goods that RoO come to the fore.  
In any FTA, an appropriate RoO regime is critical to the liberalisation of trade in goods to 
avoid restrictive intra-regional trade.191 According to Naumann, an appropriate RoO regime 
plays a critical role in the facilitation of trade between member countries to the TFTA.192 
Multiple RTAs exist among African countries and they in turn employ RoO regimes that suit 
their regional needs. This creates challenges in the implementation of trade policies and the 
administration of trade flows in the context of preferential RoO. Whilst most of these RTAs in 
Africa employ a ‘broadly generic approach’ to determining the preferential origin status of 
goods traded within the region, they often substantially differ in detail and application.193 The 
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differences in approach to RoO in part stem from the myriad of challenges faced by African 
countries, including but not limited to overlapping memberships in the different RECs.  
Against this background, this chapter focuses on the RoO regimes that are applied in the three 
RECs forming the TFTA. It begins with a background discussion of the origins and legal 
framework of the COMESA, EAC and SADC RECs and discusses the challenges to regional 
integration faced by these RECs.  
 
3.2 Origin and legal framework of the SADC, COMESA, and EAC RECs 
3.2.1 Background  
In any discussion concerning the regional integration efforts in the TFTA, it is important to 
have a background understanding of the constituent RECs of the TFTA, their origins, the legal 
framework in which they exist and the challenges to regional integration faced by the countries 
in the RECs. This is particularly so when one considers that the TFTA seeks to build on the 
progress already made in the COMESA, EAC and SADC RECs to ensure the delivery of 
meaningful development outcomes for the region. What follows below is a discussion of the 
origins and legal framework of the three RECs making up the TFTA.  
 
3.2.2 SADC    
The birth of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as an inter-governmental 
organisation can be traced back to the days of the fight against colonialism, in particular the 
efforts of the Front-Line States, a group of Southern African countries whose aim was to cast 
off the shackles of white minority rule in the region.194 It began its existence in April 1980, at 
a Summit in Lusaka, Zambia where the Front-Line states met and issued a Declaration, which 
was to become the first constitutive document of the inter-governmental organisation known 
as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In this form, it 
consisted of nine independent Southern African states,195 organised and coordinated towards 
the mobilisation of funding for developmental projects of common interest.196 Other objectives 
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identified in the Declaration were to reduce economic dependency of most, if not all of its 
members, on apartheid South Africa, mobilize resources which would be directed towards the 
promotion of the implementation of national, interstate, and regional policies and the 
establishment of links to create ‘genuine and equitable regional integration.’197  
The SADCC model of regional integration received ample support from the international 
community but a decade into its existence, weaknesses and flaws of the arrangement began to 
show. Countries were underperforming in the regional activities assigned in their respective 
areas and the SADCC Secretariat situated in Gaborone lacked the institutional powers or 
authority to force compliance with performance expectations.198 Lacking the capacity to 
finance its projects from its own resources and overly reliant on international donor funding, 
SADCC was confronted with its economic realities. With the region also facing severe drought, 
and the reduction of economic dependency on South Africa proving to be too cumbersome a 
task, it was time for a reconsideration of the SADCC model. Majority rule in South Africa was 
on the horizon and powerful trading arrangements across the world had begun to emerge, 
giving impetus to African leaders to conclude plans for a pan-African Economic Community 
(AEC) which was to be built around regional communities with specific trade liberalisation 
and market integration targets.199 With an independent South Africa’s signature available for 
taking, an opportunity beckoned for the region to emerge as the more attractive block for the 
AEC in Southern Africa, and in the process avoid being overshadowed by COMESA. 
In August 1992, SADCC was reconstituted as SADC by the SADC Treaty200, in Windhoek 
Namibia. The SADC Treaty was hurriedly drafted as the relevance of SADCC had begun to be 
questioned and amid increasing calls for it to be merged with COMESA.201 Some 
commentators regard the SADC Treaty as a document with flaws due in part, to its hurried 
drafting in order to fend off the challenge posed by COMESA.202 At its inception, the SADC 
was made up of ten countries, (now including Namibia, which had acquired independence). 
South Africa joined the organisation in 1994.  
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SADC was established in terms of Article 2(1) of the SADC Treaty, with an overarching 
objective of promoting ‘economic and social development through co-operation and economic 
integration.’203 It has its headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana.204 The SADC Treaty identified 
the objectives of the organisation as being, among other things, the achievement of 
development and economic growth, alleviation of poverty, the enhancement of quality of life 
and provision of social support to the disadvantaged through regional integration.205 In this 
regard therefore, regional integration was viewed as essential to the attainment of economic 
growth, self-sustenance, and the sustainable utilisation of the continent’s vast resources. From 
a political perspective, SADC sought to ‘evolve common political values, systems and 
institutions’, and ‘promote and defend peace and security.’206 The strengthening and 
consolidation of long standing historical, social, and political ties and linkages among the 
peoples of the region was reiterated.207 SADC member states also recognised that trade co-
operation was crucial to the success of the organisation and to this end, the SADC passed its 
Protocol on Trade in the SADC region on the 24th of August 1996.208 By further liberalising 
intra-regional trade in the SADC region through the creation of mutually beneficial trade 
arrangements, it was hoped that the SADC Trade Protocol would improve investment and 
productivity in the region. 
Apart from adding the SADC Tribunal, the SADC Treaty retained the institutional structure of 
the SADCC, with practically the same powers and responsibilities.209 There was also no 
attempt to change the approach in pursuit of the clarified and expanded objectives, including 
in new areas of co-operation. National governments, through Sector Co-ordinating Units 
located in their establishments, retained the responsibility of implementing a now revised and 
expanded regional integration agenda.210 The admission of new members who did not share a 
common social and political historical background with the region further complicated the 
organisation’s strategy towards regional integration.211  
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A review of the SADC institutions and operations between August 1999 and April 2001 
exposed these and other shortcomings of the SADC Treaty.212 This led to the adoption of the 
Agreement Amending the SADC Treaty in Blantyre, Malawi, on August 14, 2001. The 
Agreement introduced wholesome changes to the structure, policies, and processes of 
SADC.213 As such, the process of reforming the SADC culminated in the implementation of 
the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), an ambitious programme whose 
goals included the establishment of a FTA by the year 2008, a customs union (CU) by 2010 
and a common market by 2015.214 
 
3.2.3 EAC 
The East African Community (EAC) is one of the earliest efforts at regional integration in 
Africa. Although established in 1967, its roots can be traced to as far back as 1902, when Great 
Britain, as the colonial master, established an administrative organisation to foster its colonial 
interests in Tanganyika (now Tanzania), the Ugandan Protectorate (now Uganda) and the 
Colony of Kenya.215 The Colony of Kenya was the ‘the centre of the periphery’, with most of 
the industrial activity in East Africa taking place in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi.216 Although 
the economic structures of the three British colonies became intertwined and interdependent, 
Kenya’s dominance in the region led to uneven levels of development in the industrial, services 
and trade sectors.217 
As British colonial influence in the region waned, there was a general consensus among the 
leaders of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda that losing the economic structures that had been put 
in place by the colonial master would leave them at a disadvantage. Each nation therefore 
sought to protect its own interests by entering into an economic, political, and social 
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integration.218 It is against this background that, in 1967, the three former British colonies 
signed the treaty establishing the EAC.219  
The main objective of the Treaty was the establishment of the East African Common Market, 
and to this end, the Treaty provided for a common external customs tariff and curtailed the 
ability of signatories to conclude trade agreements that extended tariff concessions that were 
not available to other signatories.220 As a means of ensuring the success of the East African 
Common Market, the Treaty attempted to bring the three member states to a similar level of 
development through a system of ‘unequal sharing of benefits in favour of the economically 
less developed.’221  
Despite being regarded as one of the most advanced integration processes of its time, with ‘a 
higher level of integration than even that of the EEC’, the success story of the EAC was short-
lived.222 By 1971, the three state partnership was nearing its demise due to competition and 
inequities within the region and the Idi Amin coup in Uganda.223 By 1972, with no solid 
leadership and embroiled in political turmoil, the EAC, essentially, had ceased to exist.224 In 
April 1977, it reached a state of total collapse, losing more than 60 years of co-operation and 
benefits of economies of scale.225  
The EAC was revived in 1993 when the leaders of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda met in Arusha, 
Tanzania and signed the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite 
Commission for East African Co-operation.226 In 1996, the Secretariat of the Permanent 
Tripartite Commission was launched at the Headquarters of the EAC in Arusha, Tanzania, 
officially re-establishing the EAC. In 1997, the Heads of state of the three countries directed 
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the Permanent Tripartite Commission to upgrade the Agreement into a Treaty.227 The Treaty 
for the Establishment of the EAC was signed in 1999 and entered into force in 2000, upon 
ratification by all three-member states.228 In this regard, Kiplagaat observes that certain 
common traits amongst the three states of the EAC made them natural candidates for 
integration.229 Furthermore, their partnership made such political and economic sense that it 
was inevitable that it would be revived once the politics of the region had stabilised.230  
The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC identifies its objectives as the development of 
policies aimed at widening and deepening political, economic, and social co-operation for 
mutual benefit.231 In pursuit of these objectives, the Community undertook to establish a 
Customs Union, (CU) a Common Market, a Monetary Union, and a Political Federation.232 
The Community has to a large extent been successful in achieving its goals. In March 2004, 
efforts towards establishing the CU gained momentum through the signing of the Protocol 
Establishing the East African Customs Union, which then entered into force in 2005.233 By 
2010, these efforts culminated in the establishment of a fully-fledged CU.234 In July 2010, the 
EAC became the most advanced RTA in Africa when the EAC Common Market Protocol came 
into force after ratification by all six members of the Community.235 The protocol for the 
Establishment of the EAC Monetary Union was signed on 13 November 2013.   
 
3.2.4 COMESA 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a regional economic 
community made up of 20-member states.236 COMESA originates from the 1960’s ‘eagerness 
for regional economic co-operation during the “post-independence period” in most of 
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Africa.’237 In 1965, a few newly independent eastern and southern African states met in Lusaka 
Zambia for a ministerial meeting organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa to consider proposals for regional or sub-regional integration.238 This culminated in the 
creation of an Economic Community of Eastern and Central African states. In 1978, the 
Ministers of Trade, Finance and Planning recommended the creation of a sub-regional 
economic community which would begin with a regional preferential trade area, to be gradually 
updated into a common market over a period of ten years, before a community could be 
established.239 Thus, the treaty establishing the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern States (PTA) was signed on 21 December 1981 and came into force on 30 September 
1982 after ratification by seven signatory states.240 
Modern day COMESA came into existence in 1993, formally succeeding the PTA on 8 
December 1984.241 Its primary objectives were inter-alia:  
the attaining of sustainable growth and development of its member states; promotion 
of development in all fields of economic activity; and contributing towards the 
establishment, progress and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic 
Community.242 
 Pursuant to Article 4 of the COMESA Treaty, ‘the member states have [undertook] to establish 
a CU, eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade, establish a common external tariff and co-operate 
in customs procedures and activities.’243 In late October 2000, the COMESA FTA was 
achieved when, in accordance with the tariff reduction schedule adopted in 1992, nine member 
states eliminated tariffs on products originating from within COMESA.244 A customs union 
(CU) was launched in June 2010, at the 13th Summit of COMESA Heads of State and 
Government.   
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3.3 Challenges to regional integration 
African governments have for quite a long time embraced regional integration initiatives as a 
critical part of their development strategies.245 According to Hartzenberg, the African model of 
market integration follows a ‘stepwise integration of goods, labour and capital markets, and 
eventually monetary and fiscal integration.’246 This model commences with the establishment 
of a FTA, which is followed by a CU, leading to a common market, which then culminates in 
the integration of monetary and fiscal matters to establish an economic union.247 The 
establishment of a political union is the ultimate objective of many regional integration 
arrangements. Despite concerted efforts at regional integration through the formation of RECs 
such as SADC, COMESA and the EAC, the African model of integration has seen very little 
progress towards the deepening of economic co-operation and increasing intra-regional trade.  
Various obstacles exist which impede the full exploitation of Africa’s economic potential. 
Kimenyi and Kuhlm observe that the challenges to regional integration include political factors, 
social and cultural barriers, poor infrastructure, conflict, free movement of people within the 
region and overlapping membership in various regional organisations.248 They cite as an 
example of the political factors impeding regional integration the collapse of the EAC in 1977, 
which, they submit, was as a result of the ‘diverse governance systems’ of the day.249  
Tafese also argues that in the absence of political co-operation and unity, it is a cumbersome 
task to build strong regional co-operation and consensus.250 Flatto, who argues that political 
instability in Africa, is a threat to economic development, buttresses this view and integration 
as it has the potential of deterring investment, interrupting production, and encouraging 
educated individuals to migrate for greener pastures in peaceful regions.251 A typical example 
is the case of Zimbabwe which, following periods of political instability saw a mass exodus of 
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highly educated individuals to neighbouring South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.252  
Infrastructural problems also remain a major challenge in Africa’s regional integration efforts. 
In this regard, Hailu argues that the inadequacy of roads connecting African countries is an 
obstacle to boosting cross border trade.253 Kalenga observes that due to inadequacies in both 
the physical and regulatory transport infrastructure, a huge number of firms in sub-Saharan 
Africa have identified transportation as a major obstacle to doing business.254 Where 
transportation costs are high, the consumers are the ones who suffer the most as goods reach 
the market at an extremely high cost to the consumer.  
Overlapping membership in various regional integration organisations is perhaps the biggest 
challenge to regional integration, particularly in the context of the TFTA. Nine-member 
countries of COMESA also belong to SADC whilst five other countries belong to both 
COMESA and the EAC RECs. Tanzania has dual membership in SADC and EAC. According 
to Gathii, such overlapping membership ‘is a reflection of the large number of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements’, referred to as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon.255 Given that one 
of GATT/WTO goals is the achievement of non-discriminatory international trade, Panagariya 
argues that the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade arrangements undermines this goal 
‘through the creation of RoO that discriminate across products and countries.’256 
The spaghetti bowl phenomenon occurs when bilateral trade agreements criss-cross to create a 
maze of restrictions and regulations, which ultimately impede free trade rather than promote 
it.257 The existence of multiple memberships to preferential trading arrangements has the effect 
of cluttering up trade with discriminatory focus on origin of goods, which inevitably leads to 
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an increase in the cost of doing trade.258 It should also be noted that multiple membership to 
different trade agreements inevitably leads to selective application of RoO regimes. In this 
regard, Viljoen points out that when countries belong to more than one REC, they end up 
applying only those RoO that are simple and benefits them whilst employing different sets of 
RoO when dealing with countries belonging to different RECs.259 The differences and 
inconsistencies between RoO regimes at the regional level has the tendency to lead to greater 
complexity and a lack of transparency.260  The RoO that apply in the three RECs making up 
the TFTA are discussed below. 
 
3.4 Overview of the RoO in the COMESA, EAC and SADC RECs  
3.4.1 A brief Background 
 As discussed in the previous chapter,261 two different criteria are used in determining the origin 
of goods. On one hand is the ‘wholly produced criterion’ in which only one country is involved 
in the manufacturing or production of the goods and on the other hand is the ‘substantial 
transformation’ criterion in which more than one country is involved in the production 
process.262 The former criterion mainly applies to natural products and goods made from them 
and excludes those goods made from imported parts or materials as well as goods of 
undetermined origin. In this regard, the inquiry is whether the commodity or related product is 
entirely grown, harvested, or extracted from that country or entirely manufactured from such 
product. In the latter criterion, goods are considered as originating from a country if such goods 
have been manufactured wholly or partly from imported material, parts, or components and 
have undergone ‘substantial transformation’ or ‘sufficient working or processing’ that results 
in the manufacture of an entirely new product.263 In Anheuser-Busch Assn v. United States of 
America, substantial transformation was held to occur ‘when an article emerges from the 
manufacturing process with a name, character, or use which differs from those of the original 
materials subjected to the process.’ 264  
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Interestingly, RoO are divided into two categories, preferential and non-preferential RoO. 
Preferential RoO, usually employed in FTAs, are used to determine whether a good originates 
from a country eligible for preferential treatment whereas non-preferential RoO are used 
mainly for origin marking and trade statistics.265 According to Estevadeordal and Suominen, 
these two categories of RoO are further divided into sectoral, product specific RoO and general, 
regime-wide RoO.266  
 
3.4.2 Product specific RoO 
Under the product specific RoO, different RoO methodologies are used either singly or in 
combination with another to measure substantial transformation.267 These are: 
(i) The change in tariff heading (CTH) under the Harmonised System (HS) of Tariff 
Nomenclature. The HS was designed as a multipurpose nomenclature for 
commodity classification and statistics compilation. Under this system, goods are 
classified at a two-digit chapter level, a four-digit heading level, a six-digit 
subheading level or an eight to ten-digit level and regarded as ‘substantially 
transformed’ when classified in a heading or subheading different from the 
classification of the non-originating inputs used in the production process.268 
(ii) The specific processes (SP) criterion or the technical requirement (TECH) in terms 
of which a good is considered as substantially transformed when it undergoes 
specified manufacturing or processing requirements regardless of a change in 
classification. It also involves the express inclusion or exclusion of certain inputs 
from the manufacturing or processing operations.269 
(iii) The Value Content criterion in terms of which a product must meet a set minimum 
local value in the exporting country or in the alternative ‘remain below a certain 
ceiling percentage of value originating in the non-member countries.’270 This 
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criterion is expressed in two ways, ‘either as the minimum percentage of the value 
of the product that must be added in the exporting country (domestic or regional 
value content RVC) or as ‘the difference between the value of the final good and 
the costs of the imported inputs (import content, MC)’.271  
  
3.4.3 Regime-wide RoO 
Apart from product-specific RoO, other types of RoO applied in RoO include the de minimis 
rule, the absorption or roll-up principle and the type of cumulation.272 The de minimis rule 
specifies the maximum amount of non-originating inputs that can be used without affecting the 
origin of the product. It introduces a lenient approach to the CTH and TECH requirements 
thereby allowing goods with non-originating materials to qualify.273 The absorption or role-up 
principle allows initially non-originating material that attains originating status through 
satisfying the SP requirements to be regarded as originating when used as raw materials in 
subsequent transformation.274 Cumulation is divided into three types: bilateral, diagonal, and 
full cumulation. Firstly, Estevadeordal & Suominen writes that bilateral cumulation applies 
between two PTA partners and permits them to use products originating in the other PTA 
partner as if they were their own when seeking to qualify for the PTA-conferred preferential 
treatment in that partner.275 Secondly, diagonal cumulation finds application where countries 
tied by similar preferential RoO can use products that originate in any part of the common RoO 
zone as if they originated in the exporting country.276 Lastly, full cumulation extends the 
application of diagonal cumulation by providing that countries with similar RoO regimes can 
use goods produced in any part of the common RoO zone regardless of whether they are 
originating products: any or all of the processing carried out in the zone is calculated as if it 
had taken place in the final country of manufacture.277 
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As shall be seen below, these RoO methodologies when applied in the various RECs are 
applied either singly or in combination with one another.   
3.5. RoO in COMESA-SADC-EAC RECs 
3.5.1 SADC RoO 
Although regarded as relatively complex and highly restrictive,278 SADC RoO form the 
cornerstone of intra-regional trade within the SADC FTA and serve to prevent trade deflection 
by preventing non-SADC goods from benefiting from the preferential tariff treatment offered 
under the trade regime.279 The RoO governing trade in the SADC region are contained in Annex 
1 to the SADC Trade Protocol.280 Initially, simple and non-restrictive RoO consistent with 
those applied in developing country PTA’s such as COMESA were applied in the SADC 
region.281 Under these RoO, goods produced in Member States with non-originating materials 
were eligible for SADC preferential tariffs if  
(i) they contained at least 35 per cent regional value added or; 
(ii)  the non-SADC originating materials used in their production was not more than 
60 per cent of the total value of inputs used or; 
(iii) the production process of the goods resulted in a single change in tariff 
heading.282   
Following pressure for exceptions to these initial RoO by certain Member States driven by a 
desire to protect domestic markets, the RoO were amended to reflect ‘made-to-measure sector-
specific RoO’ that are fundamentally different from those initially agreed on.283 They reflect a 
product-specific approach to RoO.284 
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The current SADC RoO mirror those in PTAs made up of highly industrialised countries and 
are similar to RoO in the EU-South Africa and EU-ACP trade agreements. The current SADC 
RoO regime retains the wholly obtained or produced criteria285 and regards as wholly obtained 
or produced in Member States, inter-alia, any mineral products extracted from their ground or 
seabed; vegetable products harvested there; live animals born and raised within a member state 
and the products obtained from such live animals.286  
Under the sufficient processing criteria, goods produced in a Member State with non-SADC 
originating materials are considered as originating in a Member State if such goods have 
undergone sufficient working or processing within the meaning of Rule 2(2).287 Rule 2(2) lists 
in Appendix 1 the conditions, which must be satisfied in order for goods falling outside the 
wholly produced criteria to be considered as sufficiently worked or processed and thus 
originating in a Member State.  
Appendix 1 lists the various products covered by the Trade Protocol and indicates the 
processing or working to be carried out on the non-originating materials used in the 
manufacturing of the various products that confers originating status.288 The RVC criteria 
(discussed earlier) is applied to stipulate the percentage value of non-originating material 
permissible on a finished product for such product to obtain originating status and the VA 
criteria is applied to stipulate the minimum value addition in the country of manufacture.289  
Certain products listed in Appendix 1 obtain originating status through the application of the 
CTH criteria. Under this criterion, origin is obtained when there is sufficient working or 
processing which results in a change in tariff heading between the non-originating materials 
used in the production of the product and the finished product itself. 290         
SADC RoO apply the de minimis or value tolerance rule to provide relief where a product fails 
to qualify as originating due to the use of expressly excluded non-originating material of 
negligible value failing to meet the minimum percentage in terms of value criteria. Rule 3 of 
Annex 1 provides that the non-originating material in question may nevertheless be used 
‘provided their total value does not exceed 15 per cent of the ex-works price of the product and 
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any of the percentages given in the list for the maximum value of non-originating materials are 
not exceeded through the application of the de minimis rule.’291 SADC RoO also apply the 
cumulative principle in determining the origin of goods. Since SADC Member States are 
considered as one country for the purposes of determining origin, cumulation under SADC 
RoO occurs when a product is manufactured using raw materials or semi-finished goods 
originating from any of the Member States. Such raw materials or finished goods are deemed 
to have originated in the Member State where the final processing or manufacturing takes 
place.292  
Certain processes or operations such as packaging, packing, simple assembly or combining 
operations, dismantling or disassembly, slaughter of animals etc. are considered as insufficient 
to sustain a claim that goods originate in a Member State.293  
 
3.5.2 COMESA RoO 
The COMESA RoO are contained in the COMESA Protocol on RoO.294 The COMESA 
Protocol to RoO was created pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 48 of the 
COMESA Treaty, which provides that the RoO for products eligible for Common Market 
Treatment shall be set out only in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty. COMESA RoO are 
fundamentally different from those in the SADC FTA. Whilst SADC uses the line by line 
product specific approach in its RoO, COMESA uses an across the board single rule approach 
to its RoO.295 This makes SADC RoO complex and restrictive compared to the COMESA RoO 
which are simpler and less restrictive. 
The COMESA RoO accept as originating in a Member State, goods consigned directly from a 
Member State to a consignee in another Member State.296 It also applies the wholly produced 
criteria in the same way as the SADC RoO.297 The criteria for goods regarded as wholly 
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produced and thus originating in a member state is also similar to that applied in the SADC 
RoO.298  
In determining the origin of goods produced in a Member State wholly or partially from inputs 
sourced outside the Member States or of undetermined origin, the COMESA RoO require such 
goods to have undergone a process of substantial transformation.299 This process of substantial 
transformation should be such that ‘either the CIF value of non-originating material does not 
exceed 60 per cent of the total cost of the value of material used in the production of the 
goods’,300 or the value added resulting from the production process must account for at least 
35 per cent of the ex-factory cost of the product. As a third alternative, the value of non-
originating material used in the production of the goods must not exceed 25 per cent if the 
product is listed by the COMESA council as being of importance to the economic development 
of the Member States.301 The CTH criteria is also applied to confer originating status on 
substantially transformed goods if the materials used in producing the goods can be classified 
under a different heading to that of the final product.302 
The value-added threshold of 35 per cent is not uniformly applied across all Member states. 
For example, Egypt applies a 45 per cent threshold, with Member States applying the higher 
threshold on a reciprocal basis.303 Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia at some point also applied the 
45 per cent threshold but have since complied with the 35 per cent COMESA threshold. The 
differentiation in the percentage value threshold has been highly controversial with most 
Member states calling on Egypt to follow the 35 per cent COMESA RoO standard.  
 
3.5.3 EAC RoO  
The EAC established its CU in 2005 pursuant to Article 75 of the EAC Treaty. 304 The EAC 
CU imposes zero duties on goods and services traded amongst EAC Partner States. The EAC 
Partner States ‘agreed on a common external tariff (CET), whereby imports from countries 
outside the EAC zone are subjected to the same tariff when sold to any EAC Partner State.’305 
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Goods traded within the EAC are subject to certain provisions of the Protocol for the 
Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union 306 and must comply with the 
EAC RoO. The EAC RoO are set out in Annex III of the EAC CU Protocol.307 
The EAC RoO are in most respects similar to the COMESA RoO. As such, goods are regarded 
as originating in a Partner State in accordance with the wholly obtained or produced criteria308 
and where goods have been produced wholly or partly with imported material, such material 
must undergo sufficient working or processing in a Partner state according to an across the 
board 35 per cent value added rule. The CTH rule is applied to goods that are eligible and such 
goods are listed in Part 1 of the First Schedule to the RoO.309 However, the main difference 
between the EAC RoO and the COMESA RoO is that the former does not have a lower 25 per 
cent value added rule for products regarded as ‘economically important.’310  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
African countries have for much of the past decades and through various RECs been engaged 
in efforts to boost intra-African regional trade and deepening of economic co-operation. An 
analysis of the origins, goals and objectives of the various RECs reveals concerted efforts but 
albeit slow progress towards deepening economic co-operation and increasing intra-regional 
trade. This slow progress can be blamed on the myriad of problems faced by the various 
regional integration organisations in the region. Poor infrastructure, lack of resources, reliance 
on donor aid, a lack of political will, political instability and overlapping membership to the 
various RECs are just some of the problems that impede progress towards the full exploitation 
of Africa’s economic potential.  
The problem of overlapping membership is magnified by the application of divergent RoO in 
the three RECs making up the TFTA. Whilst COMESA and EAC RoO are markedly similar 
(except for the 25 per cent value added threshold applied to “economically important” products 
in COMESA), and apply an across the broad approach, SADC RoO are fundamentally 
different, applying a product specific approach that has been criticised as leading to complex 
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and restrictive RoO that constrain integration. The lack of uniformity across the RoO regimes 
applicable in the SADC and COMESA RECs raises the question as to which RoO are applied 
by countries belonging to both RECs? The solution perhaps lies in the RoO in Annex 4of the 
TFTA, which establishes a RoO regime that will be uniformly applied by all member states of 
the TFTA. The following chapter examines RoO provisions in Annex 4 of the said Agreement 
and how these RoO compare to RoO applied in particular multilateral FTAs.          
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TFTA RoO AND RoO IN THE ASEAN AND THE 
MERCUSOR FTAS 
 
4.1   Introduction.  
 
Although the TFTA Agreement was signed and came into force on 10 January 2015, there 
remained some outstanding work to be completed on certain annexures to the TFTA agreement. 
As such, negotiations on trade remedies, dispute settlement and RoO were only completed at a 
ministerial meeting held on 7 July 2017 in Kampala, Uganda.311 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the three RECs making up the TFTA, (COMESA, SADC and the EAC) all utilise 
different RoO regimes. COMESA and EAC RoO are in most aspects similar, both applying an 
across the board approach to determining origin. SADC RoO on the other hand apply a product 
and sector specific approach to determination of origin. The proposed TFTA RoO seek to 
harmonise the COMESA, EAC, and SADC RoO by designing a new RoO framework ‘that will 
apply to a much larger preferential trade area, with potentially major benefits to producers, 
exporters, and consumers in the region.’  
Significant progress has been made in the design of a new RoO framework for the TFTA. In 
2009, a draft protocol on TFTA RoO was published. After substantial revision to the 2009 draft 
protocol, a revised Annex 4 on RoO was published in December 2010. Against this 
background, this chapter analyses the TFTA RoO, and how these RoO compare with other 
FTAs, specifically the ASEAN and Mercosur FTAs.312  It also seeks to establish the extent to 
which the TFTA RoO hinder or promote intra-regional trade and economic integration in the 
tripartite territory.   
 
 
                                                          
311 ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area – a breakthrough in July 2017 as South Africa signs the Tripartite 
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53 
 
 
4.2 TFTA RoO 
Noting the different RoO regimes, as discussed in the previous chapter, The TFTA seeks to 
harmonise these RoO into a set of uniform rules that will govern the entire TFTA. According 
to Naumann, the development of a new RoO framework is necessary for distinguishing trade 
flows and the realisation of the many benefits offered by a larger and more integrated market.313 
In this regard, an effort has been made to come up with a new RoO framework that incorporates 
the RoO regimes of the three RECs but is less restrictive so as to facilitate rather than hinder 
intra-regional trade. To this end, although the new RoO framework significantly overlaps the 
COMESA-EAC RoO, it is an entirely new regulation especially with regards to the proposed 
test for substantial transformation.314 
The RoO that apply in the TFTA are set out in Annex 4 on RoO, under Article 12 of the TFTA 
Agreement.315 Article 2 Annex 4 on RoO sets out the principles that govern the application of 
the RoO.316 Interestingly, these principles are consistent with the views expressed by the private 
sector in the TFTA territory, led by the COMESA Business Council, which, since 2010, has 
come up with various positions on the TFTA RoO.317 According to Estevadeordal et al, private 
sector participation is of great importance during the negotiation of international trade 
agreements.318 This is particularly true in light of the fact that, being the exporters and importers 
in RTAs, the private sector possesses valuable information about the day-to-day trade 
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operations in RTAs and the hypothetical problems they pose and as such, the private sector 
should participate in such negotiations. During the inaugural Tripartite Regional Dialogue held 
on 26 January 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, the private sector submitted recommendations to the 
Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TTNF) calling for flexibility, simplicity, and uniformity in the 
administration of RoO and the adoption and harmonization of a Simplified Trade Regime 
(STR) to support small-scale border traders.319  
The Annex 4 on RoO concept of originating products applies the wholly obtained and the 
substantial transformation criteria.320 This is the same criteria applied in the COMESA, SADC 
and EAC RECs, with the only difference being that the wholly obtained criteria in Annex 4 on  
RoO has been slightly expanded to cover products of Mari culture321 , products made aboard 
factory ships322, and products extracted from marine soil or subsoil outside the territorial waters 
of Tripartite Member States.323  
When determining the origin of products manufactured with non-originating materials Annex 
4 on RoO employs a percentage test (value of materials used) or, as an alternative, the change 
in tariff heading or the specific processes method for products listed in Appendix 1.324 In terms 
of Article 5 of Annex 4 on RoO, ‘sufficient working or processing’ occurs either when the 
value of non-originating material used in the manufacture of a good does not exceed 70 per 
cent of the ex-works price of a product or when the value of originating material is equal to at 
least 30 per cent of the ex-works price of the good.325 Operations to ensure preservation of 
products during transportation and storage, removing of dust, screening, repackaging, simple 
assembly of parts and the slaughter of animals amongst others are all regarded as insufficient 
working or processing for the purposes of conferring originating status on products.326  
As is the case in the COMESA, SADC, and EAC RoO, cumulation is also applied in the TFTA 
RoO. In this regard, products originating from a Tripartite Member State and subsequently 
used in the manufacture of another product in another Tripartite Member State are treated as if 
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they originate in the Tripartite State of further manufacture.327 This allows producers in a TFTA 
member state to use raw materials from another (or other, as the case may be) TFTA 
member(s), without disqualifying the final product from preferential treatment.328  
Annex 4 on RoO also introduces the principle of territoriality, which was not present in the 
COMESA, SADC, EAC RoO.329 The principle of territoriality allows Tripartite Member States 
to export materials, which have acquired originating status for processing or working outside 
the member state.  Tripartite member states can then re-import the exported material without 
this affecting its originating status provided the value acquired outside the Member State does 
not exceed 10 per cent of the end product for which originating status is being claimed.330 This 
principle is also applied in the European Community origin rules.331  
Annex 4 on RoO also adopts the STR in terms of which goods imported by small cross border 
traders valued at less than US$2000 are exempt from proof of origin requirements provided the 
cross-border trader is “endorsed by adjacent Customs authorities” and the goods imported are 
regarded as commonly traded goods.332 The STR programme, which is consistent with Article 
VIII of GATT and certain provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention for the Simplification 
and Harmonization of Customs Procedures is also employed in COMESA where it aims at 
simplifying customs clearance procedures as well as reducing the costs of trading for small 
scale cross border traders.333 In May 2017, SADC ministers responsible for trade mandated the 
SADC Secretariat to develop a STR for intra-SADC trade in accordance with the WTO 
Agreement and the Revised Kyoto Convention.334  
Annex 4 on RoO seeks to bring uniformity to RoO in the COMESA, SADC, and EAC tripartite 
territory. In so doing, it introduces simple, easy to administer and comply with RoO framework 
that, to some extent, addresses the problem of divergent RoO regimes in the tripartite territory. 
Against this background, it is important to consider how the proposed TFTA RoO compare to 
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other RoO frameworks in various RTAs across the globe. What follows is an attempt to 
compare the TFTA RoO with the RoO applicable in the ASEAN and Mercosur RTAs. It should 
be noted at the outset that Annex 4 on RoO does not as yet contain Appendix 1 (which contains 
a list of products whose originating status is determined in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 5(2) of Annex 4 on RoO) and it is therefore not possible to conduct a product by product 
comparison of the RoO applicable in the three RTAs. As such, the comparison is confined to 
origin determining provisions in the three RTAs. To put the comparison into context, a brief 
background discussion of the ASEAN and Mercosur RTAs precedes the comparison of the 
three RTAs.   
 
4.3 The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)  
 
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) emerged from earlier efforts directed at 
integrating Latin American economies through the 1960 Montevideo Convention, which gave 
birth to the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)335 and the 1980 Treaty of 
Montevideo that created the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). In the mid-1980s 
Brazil and Argentina, the two major economic players in Latin America, began efforts directed 
at refocusing their relationship with one another and with the rest of the industrialised world 
through the signing of the 1985 Declaration of Iguaçu.336 More Brazilian-Argentine agreements 
would follow as the two countries viewed and pursued integration as a strategy to increase and 
enhance domestic production, with the aim of satisfying both domestic and international 
markets. The ultimate goal these countries sought to achieve was the development of faltering 
entrepreneurial networks.337  
As such, this pursuit of integration as a strategy for the enhancement of domestic production 
culminated in the signing of the Argentine-Brazilian Economic Cooperation and Integration 
Act, which came into force in 1986.338 Its aim was the setting up of a “Common Economic 
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Space”.339 Sectoral integration covering diverse productive aspects and not just commerce was 
the central implementing technique of the 1986 Act. It was conceived that integration would 
develop through the progression of trade within “self-contained sectors” and the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers would give rise to intersectoral specialisation that would result in 
interconnected economic networks.340 These sectors were separately and individually regulated 
by Protocols, each Protocol setting out the different objectives, time-frames, and levels of 
integration. 
Despite reaping some benefits through this imaginative approach at integration, problems 
would soon arise. Brazil and Argentina had different economic policies, which meant that 
harmonisation was going to be difficult. Furthermore, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers failed to produce intra-sectorial specialisation as expected and did not do much to 
curtail the re-emergence of protectionist measures. Noting these concerns on 29 November 
1988, Brazil and Argentina concluded the Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration341 
whose general economic goal was the establishment of a global Common Market.342 Although 
the 1988 Treaty sought to reformulate the 1986 Act, it retained both its conceptual and 
methodological approach.343 The 1988 Treaty prescribed, inter-alia, a gradual reduction of 
customs duties and non-tariff barriers on goods and services over an initial ten-year phase,344 
the coordination of policies required to establish a common market and the adoption of an inter-
governmental system without envisaging any organic structure.345  
On July 6, 1990, Brazil and Argentina signed the Buenos Aires Act, which brought further 
dramatic changes to Brazil-Argentina economic relations.346 This Act introduced an automatic 
tariff elimination system, placed more emphasis on macro-economic policies and 
institutionalised integration. It thus reformulated the undefined characteristics of the 1988 
Treaty into a precise Common Market System. Soon thereafter, Brazil and Argentina 
concluded the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion347 by which MERCOSUR was established. Paraguay 
and Uruguay, two countries economically dependent on Brazil and Argentina, requested to be 
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included in Mercosur out of fear that they may be excluded out of a Common Market between 
two of their largest trading partners.348 Further, Bolivia and Chile would later join Mercosur as 
associated members.349  
Noting the scaffolding of Mercosur, it is clear that it was designed to work on the principle of 
reciprocity, seeking to achieve integration through the lowering of customs tariffs, elimination 
of non-tariff barriers and the creation of a common external tariff.350  
RoO in Mercosur are discussed in the comparison between the TFTA RoO, ASEAN-CEPT 
RoO and Mercosur RoO.351  
 
4.4 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)  
4.4.1 Background 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 
through the signing of the Bangkok Declaration.352 It is regarded as “one of the most 
economically dynamic economic groups in the world, an active player in the global FTA 
movement and the centre of regional integration and co-operation efforts in East Asia.”353 At 
its inception, its member states were Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore. Although formed primarily as a response to the accelerating political situation in 
the region, the Bangkok Declaration establishing ASEAN mentioned “accelerating economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development in the region” as one of the main aims and 
objectives of the association.354 According to Komuro, armed conflict between the US and 
Vietnam and the Red Guards Cultural Revolution in China, combined with internal political 
turmoil provided the impetus for the creation of Asian institutions.355 Koolaee and Sazmand, 
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who are of the view that ASEAN was formed to create a single front against the spread of 
communism, express similar views.356  
Since ASEAN’s establishment was primarily meant to, deal with political issues there was very 
little activity on the economic front until the mid-1970’s. It is not surprising that the first 
ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 1976 led to the adoption of the Treaty of Amity and Co-
operation and the ASEAN Co-operation Declaration. The Treaty called for the observance of 
non-interference principles as well as the promotion of economic development and the 
strengthening of economic co-operation whilst under the Declaration, Member States were to 
adopt action programmes covering political collaboration and economic, social, and cultural 
co-operation.357 To this end, various initiatives such as the 1977 Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (PTA), the 1981 Industrial Complementation Scheme and the 1983 Industrial 
Joint Venture Project were set up with a long-term view at economic co-operation.   
The main objective of the ASEAN PTA was trade liberalization within the ASEAN group.358 
The PTA placed an obligation upon all ASEAN Member states to gradually increase the 
products covered by preferences and to voluntarily lower internal tariffs. In the beginning, the 
PTA applied a 10 per cent margin of preference, which was negotiated on a voluntary product-
by-product basis.359 Agricultural, fishing and mining products wholly obtained within the 
ASEAN acquired a 100 per cent ASEAN origin and were thus eligible for preferential 
treatment in an importing member state.360 Industrial products manufactured in a member state 
with materials sourced not only from the ASEAN but also from third countries had to satisfy 
the 50 per cent value added criterion.361 Such products were entitled to preferences only if the 
value of the ASEAN content reached 50 per cent of the final good’s CIF price in the importing 
Member State.362 
Despite the reduction of the value-added criterion to 35 per cent and the increasing of the 
margin of preference to 40 per cent, the PTA remained impotent.363 ASEAN Member States 
lacked the enthusiasm that would push ASEAN into a free trade area mainly because their 
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economies were more competitive than complimentary and thus focused more on the protection 
of domestic markets.364 Furthermore, the PTA did not benefit manufacturers based in the 
ASEAN countries who depended on third country sourced parts and materials. Most of their 
products did not enjoy any tariff preferences in ASEAN Member States as they failed to meet 
the 50 per cent valued added origin criterion.365  
As multinational companies globalized production and regional economic co-operation in most 
regions accelerated, it was only a matter of time before ASEAN made the transition from the 
impotent PTA to a new FTA. Thailand’s Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun proposed the 
establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which would pursue the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the six countries over a ten-year period.366 In 
January 1992, the Fourth Singapore ASEAN summit established AFTA. AFTA’s primary 
objective was the attainment of economy-of-scale benefits within the ASEAN region. It also 
sought the liberalization of intra-regional trade through reducing the AFTA preferential duty 
rate to zero and the elimination of non-tariff barriers.367   
 
4.4.2 ASEAN RoO 
RoO in AFTA are guided by the Agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 
for AFTA (CEPT).368 CEPT is AFTA’s pillar for intra-regional preferential purposes. One of 
the scheme’s main objectives is to achieve co-operation among ASEAN Member States to 
reduce intra-regional preferential tariffs on most products.369 To this end, the scheme adopted 
a tariff reduction schedule for the ASEAN original six Member States and a slightly different 
tariff reduction schedule for the four new ASEAN Member States.370  
The schedule for the original six required a reduction in AFTA preferential duties from a high 
of about 20-30 per cent to a low of 0-5 per cent over a period of 15 years.371 The reduction of 
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AFTA preferential duties was twice accelerated by the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) 
Conference, first in 1994 when the period over which reduction would take place was reduced 
to 10 years and then again in 2001 when the period was reduced to 9 years.372 A degree of 
flexibility was incorporated in the accelerated schedule which permitted Member States to 
derogate from the reduction schedule.  The accelerated duty reduction was not strictly complied 
with as some of the original six opted for the flexible policy to delay the implementation of the 
tariff reduction schedule.373 To enforce compliance with the accelerated schedule, the first 
ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM)374 requested a reduction of preferential 
duties to less than 5 percent by the end of 2003 and that 60 percent of CEPT-covered products 
be subjected to zero preferential duty by the end of 2003.375 
A tolerant tariff reduction schedule was introduced for the four new ASEAN Member States 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos.376 These countries were expected to reduce 
preferential tariffs to less than 5 percent by 2006 to 2010 depending on the country. Reduction 
of preferential tariffs on sensitive products was postponed to 2018.377  
 
4.5 Comparison of TFTA, ASEAN and Mercosur RoO 
4.5.1 Wholly obtained criteria 
The wholly obtained criteria for determining the origin of goods is applied in both Annex 4 on 
RoO and the ASEAN-CEPT RoO. In terms of Article 3(1)(a) of Annex 4 on RoO, products 
produced in Tripartite Member States as contemplated in Article 4 of Annex 4 are regarded as 
originating in the Tripartite Member States. Article 4 provides a list of products that are 
considered as wholly obtained in the Tripartite Member States.378 The wholly obtained criteria 
applied in the AFTA-CEPT RoO is the same as that applied in Annex 4 on RoO. In terms of 
Rule 1(a) of the AFTA-CEPT RoO, products under the CEPT Scheme that are imported into 
the territory of a Member State from another Member State qualify for preferential concessions 
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if they are wholly produced as defined in Rule 2 of the AFTA-CEPT RoO. Further, Rule 2 
contains a list that is identical in all respects to the list in Article 4 of Annex 4 on RoO. 
Similarly, the Mercosur Origin System also applies the wholly obtained criteria but instead of 
using the phrase ‘wholly obtained’, it uses the word ‘native’. Thus, in terms of Article 3(a) of 
the Mercosur RoO, products are considered ‘native’ if they are manufactured in a Mercosur 
State Party only with materials originating from any of the Mercosur State Parties.379  Article 
3(b) then list products also considered “native” which are no different to the products regarded 
as wholly obtained in Article 4 of  Annex 4 on RoO and Rule 2 of the AFTA RoO respectively. 
To this extent, despite a difference in the terminology used there is some similarity in the 
application and content of the wholly obtained criteria for determining origin in the Draft 
TFTA, the AFTA and Mercosur RoO.   
 
4.5.2 Sufficient working or processing criteria 
In determining the origin of goods that have not been wholly obtained or produced,  Annex 4 
on RoO employs the sufficiently worked or processed criterion.380 According to this criterion, 
products manufactured in a Tripartite State incorporating materials not wholly obtained from 
the Tripartite territory are considered as originating products if they have undergone sufficient 
working or processing.381 For a product to qualify as sufficiently worked or processed, either 
the value of non-originating material used in the manufacture of the product must not exceed 
70 per cent of the ex-works price of the good or the value of the originating materials used in 
the production of the good is at least equal to 30 per cent of the ex-works price of the good.382 
Appendix 1 to  Annex 4 on RoO contains a list of products and the conditions which must be 
fulfilled for these products to be considered sufficiently worked or processed. The conditions 
indicate the change in tariff classification or the working or processing which non-originating 
materials used in the manufacture of a product must undergo before the product can be 
conferred originating status. 
 Under the AFTA RoO, a regional value content (RVC) of 40 per cent applies as a general rule 
to non-wholly produced products.383 The test to be applied is that at least 40 per cent of a 
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product’s content must originate from an ASEAN Member State.384 The AFTA RoO 
incorporates the sufficiently worked or processed criteria. In this regard, the AFTA RoO 
require that the total value of raw materials or inputs originating from non-ASEAN countries 
or of undetermined origin used in the manufacture of a good does not exceed 60 per cent of the 
FOB value of a product and that the final process of manufacture occurs within the territory of 
the exporting Member State.385  
On the other hand, the Mercosur RoO apply the CTC criteria for determining the origin of 
products manufactured in the Mercosur territory with materials not ‘native’ to Mercosur State 
Parties.386 In some cases, the CTC criteria is used in combination with the RVC rule, requiring 
a 60 per cent value addition to confer originating status.387 
It is thus evident that, of the three FTAs under comparison, the TFTA applies a relaxed rule in 
determining the origin of products manufactured with non-originating material. A comparison 
of RoO regimes in RTAs across the world revealed that no RTAs in the world permits up to a 
maximum of 70 per cent non-originating material, with the average percentage of imported 
material allowed ranging between 40-60 per cent.388  
4.5.3 Processes not conferring originating status 
Processes or operations carried out in the territory of a State Party which result in a product 
acquiring the final form in which it will be marketed do not confer originating status when such 
processes or operations consists only of assembling, packaging, marking and or mere dilution 
that does not enable the product to be considered ‘native’.389 Similarly, under  Annex 4 on 
RoO, processes or operations such as mere packaging, simple mixing of products where one 
or more of the products do not meet the criteria for originating status, affixing labels, assembly 
of parts etc. are all insufficient to confer originating status on non-originating products.390 
Under the AFTA RoO, where Member States treat products separately from their packaging 
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for the purposes of calculating customs duty, they may also determine the origin of such 
packaging.391  
 
4.5.4 Cumulation 
 Annex 4 on RoO permits cumulation between member states.392 In this regard, products 
originating in any Tripartite Member State and used in further manufacture in another Tripartite 
state are considered as originating from the state of further manufacture. The AFTA RoO also 
has the cumulative RoO but it is subject to the proviso that the aggregate ASEAN content of 
the final product is not less than 40 per cent.393 Mercosur RoO contains no provision that deals 
with cumulation.  
The above comparison of the TFTA, AFTA and Mercosur RoO reveals that RoO in the TFTA 
are more or less similar to the AFTA RoO. However, the TFTA RoO go even further than the 
ASEAN RoO by permitting the use of up to 70 per cent non-originating materials in the 
production of goods eligible for preferential tariffs.394 This is a welcome development as it 
affords producers a wide range of options in choosing where to source the cheapest raw 
materials.  
   
4.6 To what extent does Annex 4 on RoO hinder or promote regional trade?  
Although RoO are primarily meant to prevent trade deflection, they could in themselves end 
up impeding intra-regional trade.395 It is therefore important that, in order to maximize the 
benefits of RTAs, the formulation of RoO should not only focus on preventing trade deflection 
but also aim to facilitate trade.396 Trade facilitation basically entails simplification, 
modernisation and harmonisation of import and export processes so as to reduce the cost and 
time needed to import and export goods.397 It is of vital importance for developing countries, 
seeing that in most cases, trade costs are critically dependent on the efficiency and cost of entry 
and exit of goods in the trading country, as well as on the cost of transit of goods via 
neighbouring countries.398 Developing countries have committed to the immediate 
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implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which came into force on 22 
February 2017.399 The TFA introduces measures for the expeditious movement of goods across 
borders inspired by the best practises from around the world.400 Simple, flexible, and easy to 
administer and comply with RoO are thus more likely to aid trade facilitation whilst complex 
and restrictive RoO can have the opposite effect.  
Suominen and Estevadeordal examined RoO applied in more than 100 RTAs and found that 
restrictive and selective RoO have the effect of discouraging trade flows.401 A report by 
Bjuggren and Lundström402, reveals that restrictive RoO have the potential to greatly reduce 
the ability of firms to integrate in global value chains (GVC).403 Flatters and Kirk argue that 
restrictive RoO deprive producers of access to inputs or intermediate products from low cost 
international sources and as such, can potentially increase the cost of producing products to be 
sold in the PTA.404 In this respect, Naumann is of the view that the stricter RoO become, the 
more onerous compliance becomes, especially for developing countries due to poor 
infrastructure or a less developed domestic production capability.405 Gretton and Jali argue that 
the economic impact of RoO is dependent on the restrictiveness of the rules and ‘on the extent 
to which the external tariff regimes of the member countries differ.’406 They argue that when 
RoO are highly restrictive, they erode the gains attained from reduced tariffs and therefore ‘the 
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less trade restricting RoO in a PTA are, the better the chances of realising significant welfare 
benefits.407 It is therefore evident that complex and restrictive RoO have the potential to impede 
trade. Thus, it is important that, in order to promote intra-regional trade and economic 
integration, the TFTA RoO should be formulated in such a manner that they facilitate rather 
than become an obstacle to intra-regional trade. 
Notably, the text of Annex 4 on RoO indicates that the RoO have been formulated in such a 
manner that they promote rather than hinder intra-regional trade. Some reasons could be 
proffered to substantiate the argument. Firstly, Annex 4 on RoO applies the across-the-board 
percentage value basis for determining origin which is applied in the COMESA and EAC RECs 
rather than the product specific approach employed in SADC. Experience has shown that the 
product specific approach to RoO the leads to complex and restrictive RoO which in turn 
impede regional trade.408 The across the board approach has been successful in the COMESA 
and EAC RECs and was recommended by the private sector during a Tripartite private sector 
consultative meeting on RoO, held in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010. 
Secondly, Annex 4 on RoO applies a 30 per cent domestic content rule and a 70 per cent non-
originating content rule based on the ex-works price.409 Most RTAs apply a domestic content 
rule of usually between 40-60 per cent whilst the average percentage value of non-originating 
materials that can be used is a maximum of 60 per cent. By applying a low domestic content 
rule of 30 per cent and allowing the use of up to 70 per cent non-originating material in the 
production of goods eligible for tariff preferences, Annex 4 on RoO affords producers a wide 
range of options from which to source cheap raw materials. Allowing producers to access raw 
materials or intermediate products from low cost international sources through relaxed RoO is 
vital for the generation of economic activity and facilitating development.410 This is particularly 
true for developing countries, where, given the abundance of cheap labour, simple 
manufacturing operations that provide little value addition can create important job 
opportunities.411  
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Lastly, Annex 4 on RoO implements the STR, which is as a result of private sector participation 
during negotiations of the TFTA RoO. As already discussed above, the STR is consistent with 
Article VIII of GATT as well as certain provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention, which 
suggest the development, and implementation of simplified trade procedures for eligible small-
scale traders.412 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Notably, compared to the Mercosur and ASEAN, Annex 4 on RoO reveals a successful attempt 
at harmonisation of the COMESA, SADC and EAC RoO. The RoO have been formulated in 
such a way that they are as trade facilitating as possible. In this regard, the RoO in   Annex 4 
on RoO are simple, easy to administer and comply with. By including private sector 
participation in the negotiations of the TFTA RoO, the drafters of the RoO have been able to 
cater for the needs of small scale cross-border traders through the STR programme.  
The RoO in Annex 4 are similar in most respects to the AFTA RoO, although the TFTA RoO 
have opened up trade further by permitting the use of up to 70 per cent non-originating material 
in the manufacture of products eligible for tariff preferences. Annex 4 on RoO has therefore 
been formulated to promote rather than hinder intra-regional trade and economic integration.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
5.1  Introduction 
African countries, along with the rest of the world, have for quite some time been pursuing 
regional economic integration at various stages of integration. The TFTA, together with the 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) are Africa’s latest regional integration pursuits, with 
negotiations for the CFTA being launched within a few days of the launch of the 
TFTA.413Amidst the political and economic negotiations, a topical area that sought clarification 
was the operation of RoO. The preceding chapters alluded that the TFTA aims to boost intra-
African regional trade and economic integration through the harmonisation of the RoO that 
apply in the RECs making up the TFTA. In this regard, an appropriate RoO regime is critical 
to the liberalisation of trade in goods to avoid restrictive intra-regional trade and it plays a 
critical role in the facilitation of trade between the countries in the TFTA.414  
At the outset, the main research question this thesis sought to answer concerned the extent to 
which the RoO the TFTA hinder or promote regional trade and economic integration. This final 
chapter discusses the findings of this thesis, particularly the extent to which RoO in the TFTA 
hinder or promote intra-regional trade and economic integration and proffers recommendations 
to policy makers involved in the design of the RoO regime that will apply in the tripartite 
territory. 
 
5.2   Findings 
The chapters identified the various challenges to regional integration that exist in Africa. More 
pertinent to the focus area of this thesis is overlapping membership to the various RECs in 
Africa and the multiplicity of RoO regimes. As this thesis revealed, many authors have 
highlighted the negative effect of overlapping membership to various RECs. Aptly termed the 
“spaghetti bowl” phenomenon by Bhagwati, overlapping membership to different RECs has 
                                                          
413 ‘African Integration: Facing up to Emerging Challenges’ International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) 2016 available at https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11045/african-integration-facing-
up-to-emerging-challenges-ictsd-december-2016.pdf accessed on 24 February 2017 
414 Naumann, (note 25 above) 2.  
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been blamed on the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements.415 It has also been 
argued that multiple bilateral and regional trade agreements have the effect of undermining the 
GATT/WTO goal of non-discriminatory international trade through the formulation of RoO 
that discriminate across products and countries.416  
An important finding of this thesis is that overlapping membership to different RTAs leads to 
high transaction costs and poses serious difficulties in the country’s ability to comply with the 
multiple RoO regimes.417 This contention is borne out of the fact that when a country belongs 
to more than one RTA, it is expected to apply the RoO regimes applicable in the respective 
RTAs. Where there is a divergence in the RoO regimes applicable in the respective RTAs, this 
increases the complexity of the customs clearance procedure and the administrative oversight 
required to keep track of origin documentation and procedures.418 Thus by employing a 
uniform RoO regime in the COMESA-SADC-EAC tripartite territory, the TFTA to some 
extent addresses this problematic consequence of overlapping membership in different RTAs. 
Member states will apply a similar RoO regime across the TFTA territory thus improving 
transparency, eliminating inconsistencies, and reducing complexity of customs procedures.  
A further finding of this thesis is that the COMESA and EAC RoO are in most respects similar, 
whilst the SADC RoO are different and largely mirror those of the EU trade agreements.419 
The COMESA and EAC RoO apply the across-the-board approach to determining origin. This 
approach has been largely successful in these RECs and drawing from that success, the private 
sector has recommended the application of the across-the-board approach in the TFTA RoO.420 
The across-the-board approach to determining origin contrasts sharply with the product and 
sector specific approach applied in SADC. The product and sector specific approach applied 
in SADC has been criticised as complex and highly restrictive.421 It is accepted in this thesis 
that indeed, SADC RoO are complex and restrictive. Complex RoO impose administrative 
burdens on customs authorities by requiring a more careful identification of which rule applies 
and what is the correct tariff classification. Restrictive RoO limit the input pool by placing 
                                                          
415 Gathii (note 255 above) 657.  
416 Panagariya (note 256 above) 328. 
417 Chapter 2, page 41.  
418 A Krueger ‘Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas’ in Takatoshi & Krueger (eds) Regionalism versus 
Multilateral Trade Arrangements Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, (1997) 9, 18. For a more detailed discussion 
on RoO divergence, see Estevadeordal et al (note 309 above) 33-39.   
419 Chapter 2, pages 46-47.  
420 Naumann (note 284 above) 7.    
421 P Brenton et al (note 52 above) 20. See also Gretton and Jali (note 406 above) 7, for the view that sector-
specific RoO are ‘commonly more stringent that rules of general application’ particularly for ‘so called “sensitive” 
sectors’ as their primary purpose is to protect these sectors from competition.   
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restrictions on the use of non-originating materials, creating distortive effects on regional trade. 
Bearing in mind the principles governing the application of RoO in the TFTA422, it is thus 
hardly surprising that there has been a reluctance to adopt a product and sector specific 
approach in the formulation of the TFTA RoO.   
This thesis also found that the TFTA RoO affords producers a wide range of options in 
choosing where to source raw materials in the manufacture of goods. This is achieved by 
permitting the use of up to 70 per cent non-originating material in the manufacture of products 
eligible for tariff preferences.423 In this regard, the TFTA RoO go a step further than most FTAs 
whose average range of permissible non-originating material is between 40-60 per cent.424 It is 
important to note that the application of such a relaxed rule in determining the origin of non-
wholly obtained or produced goods will be highly beneficial to producers in the tripartite 
territory. It will allow producers to benefit from the varying costs of raw materials in different 
locations across the world and thus be able to source the cheapest raw materials possible. This 
will in turn generate economic activity in the beneficiary countries leading to the facilitation of 
development.425 
Yet another finding of this thesis is that the TFTA RoO has been formulated in such a way that 
it is as trade facilitating as possible. This is evidenced by the utilization of the across-the-board 
approach to determining origin, the utilization of a 70 per cent non-originating content rule and 
the simplification of customs clearance procedures and reduction of trading the costs for small 
scale cross border traders through the STR programme. The first two have already been 
discussed above.426  The third, the STR programme, aims at simplifying customs clearance 
procedures and reducing the costs of trading for small scale cross border traders. This is in line 
with Article VIII of GATT and certain provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention for the 
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.427 
 
 
 
                                                          
422  Annex 4 on RoO, Article 2. 
423  Annex 4 on RoO, Article 5. 
424 For example, the AFTA and MERCOSUR RoO permit up to a maximum of 60% non-originating material. 
425 ‘Trade as a driver of prosperity’. (note 398 above) 
426 Page 69, para 3; page 70, para 2. 
427 Revised Kyoto Convention (note 105 above). 
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5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Encourage effective private and public-sector participation 
The process of negotiating a free trade area requires the effective participation of the various 
players whose actions (or lack thereof) has the potential to influence the success or failure of 
the FTA. In Africa, negotiating trade agreements has largely been the domain of political actors 
who are state-centric and thus seek to protect sovereign interests rather than pursue genuine 
economically beneficial policies.428 In this regard, it is important to note that it is not only the 
political actors whose views and contributions are critical in shaping the direction in which the 
negotiations should progress. Private and public-sector participation is no doubt critical to the 
success of any international trade agreement.  
In the TFTA, there is no doubt that the private sector, through multinational companies and 
businesses, are the implementers and drivers of regional trade. It is these businesses, which 
bear the high costs of border delays and cumbersome customs clearance procedures. As such 
the thesis emphasises that the public sector are the final consumers of the products whose trade 
the tripartite agreement seeks to boost. It is therefore critical that both these sectors be afforded 
a central role in the trade negotiations that provides them a platform to voice their concerns 
and effectively participate in the regional integration agenda. The TFTA can draw some 
valuable lessons from the ASEAN, which acknowledges “the participation and collaboration 
of the private sector are crucial to the creation of a strong foundation for the establishment of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).”429 In this regard, ASEAN appointed a Business 
Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) whose role is to lead the coordination of inputs from various 
business councils and entities in their engagements with different ASEAN sectoral groups. 
Rules of Procedure for Private Sector engagement were also devised and adopted to ensure 
more effective Public Private Sector engagement.430  
 
5.3.2 Encourage SADC RoO amendment 
Many trade experts have bemoaned the complexity and restrictiveness of SADC RoO. The 
negative effects of complex and restrictive RoO have been highlighted in this thesis. Given that 
those tasked with designing an appropriate RoO regime in the tripartite territory have sought 
                                                          
428 Hailu (note 233 above) 325. 
429 ‘Public Private Sector Engagement (PPE)’ available at  http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/sectoral-
bodies-under-the-purview-of-aem/public-private-sector-engagement-ppe accessed on 14 February 2018.  
430 Ibid.    
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to harmonise the RoO in the constituent RECs of the TFTA, perhaps it is time to revisit and 
explore the possibility of amending SADC RoO with a view to adopting the COMESA and 
EAC model of RoO. It is hypothesized that once the SADC RoO are similar to the COMESA 
and EAC RoO, the process of implementation and application of the TFTA RoO to the tripartite 
territory will be easier and less complex given that Annex 4 on RoO is modelled around the 
COMESA and EAC RoO. Although this might not bode well with some SADC countries such 
as South Africa,431 it is no doubt the only way to achieve uniformity of RoO in the TFTA.432    
 
5.3.3 Expedite the completion of Appendix 1 to Annex 4 on RoO 
Appendix 1 to Annex 4 on RoO is meant to contain a schedule of products whose originating 
status is determined in accordance with Article 5(2) of Annex 4 on RoO. However, Annex 4 
on RoO does not contain this product list.433 When the TFTA was launched in June 2015, only 
25 per cent of the product list had been negotiated and agreed, rendering TFTA Agreement 
incomplete.434 An undertaking was made at the Third Meeting of Tripartite Council of 
Ministers to finalise the product list within 12 months.435 At the expiry of the 12 months the 
constituent RECs of the TFTA had reached a common position on the proportion of tariff lines 
to be liberalised. However, no consensus could be reached on a common tariff to be applied to 
sensitive products such as textiles, cement, wheat, sugar, and maize, products whose trade is 
considered critical to the growth of domestic industries.436 At the time of writing this thesis, 
the product list is yet to be published despite the finalisation and adoption of the annexure on 
RoO at the ministerial meeting of 7 July 2017 in Kampala.437 Against this background 
                                                          
431 South Africa has been resolute in the use of tariffs to protect domestic industries. Given that SADC RoO are 
arguably protectionist, it is unlikely that South Africa would support an across-the-board approach to RoO 
which may offer little protection to its domestic industries. See ‘South Africa to be ‘resolute’ in using tariffs to 
protect domestic industry’ available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/south-africa-to-be-resolute-in-
using-tariffs-to-protect-domestic-industry-2017-02-15 accessed on the 15th of February 2018.  
432 South Africa, as the largest economy in the TFTA has been strongly opposed to the across-the-board approach 
to RoO favoured by COMESA and EAC member states, preferring instead SADC’s more tailored approach to 
RoO. See Naumann (note 267 above) 276. 
433 See note 315 above. 
434 Mabuza & Luke (note 11 above).  
435 Ibid. 
436 J Ayanzwa ‘African Blocs Fail to Agree on Free Trade Area’ (16 July 2016) available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201607160044.html accessed 7 February 2018; See also J Ayanzwa ‘Discussions on 
rules of origin, tariffs hold up free trade pact’ 25 December 2017 available at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Discussions-on-rules-of-origin-tariffs-hold-up-free-trade-pact/2560-
4241102-format-xhtml-5vx4n/index.html accessed on the 3 January 2018.  
437 The Tripartite Free Trade Area – a breakthrough in July 2017 as South Africa signs the Tripartite Agreement. 
Available at https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11860-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-a-breakthrough-in-july-
2017-as-south-africa-signs-the-tripartite-agreement.html. Accessed on the 7th of January 2018.  
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therefore, it is highly recommended that the completion of work on the product list be 
expedited. This would assist the private sector and business stakeholders in knowing which 
products are eligible for which tariff preferences in the TFTA territory. 
5.3.4 Provide guidelines on the application of conflicting RoO regimes in the COMESA, 
SADC and EAC RECs pending the coming into force of TFTA RoO. 
Although the TFTA RoO harmonise the RoO regimes in the TFTA constituent RECs, the 
application and compliance with the TFTA RoO will undoubtedly not occur over a short period 
of time given that trade within the region has been and will continue to be conducted on the 
basis of the existing RoO regimes in the three RECs. In this regard, a transitional period will 
no doubt be beneficial to all involved as businesses position themselves to start implementing 
the TFTA RoO. Annex 4 on RoO contains no provision that addresses this scenario. As such, 
conflicting RoO regimes in the TFTA RECs have the potential to impede regional trade through 
the imposition of cumbersome administrative procedures and high compliance costs. It is 
therefore important that guidelines be issued that addresses how member states will deal with 
conflicting RoO regimes during this transitional period pending the coming into force of the 
TFTA RoO.  
 
5.4   Conclusion  
 
Regional integration remains the key strategy for the attainment of economic development in 
Africa. It remains one of the ways in which the continent can fulfil its economic potential and 
assume its rightful place in the world. However, the story of African integration efforts thus far 
does not make for a good reading. Various challenges and obstacles stand in the way of Africa’s 
integration efforts. Political strife, a lack of adequate infrastructure, diseases and poverty, a 
lack of political will and multiple membership to various REC are among the main challenges 
faced by the continent. Furthermore, governments have tended to pursue political policies that 
do not translate to significant economic gains for the African population.  It is therefore 
important that the policy makers driving integration initiatives such as the TFTA adopt an 
approach that confronts these challenges and implement policies that offers solutions to these 
problems. 
 
FTAs no doubt remain the dominant form of regional integration initiatives in Africa. It is 
unsurprising therefore that the TFTA, together with the CFTA are Africa’s latest integration 
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efforts. Against this background, the role played by preferential RoO in FTAs should not be 
undermined. RoO play a critical role in determining preferential market access. Whilst their 
main role is the prevention of trade deflection, RoO “can become the fine print that 
circumscribes the potential market integration of the [TFTA].”438 This thesis emphasizes that 
the RoO in the TFTA must be designed in such a way that the TFTA members benefit from 
preferential market access and the RoO themselves are as trade facilitating as possible. Key to 
trade facilitation is a flexible input sourcing regime that promotes efficiency and 
competitiveness.  
 
That RoO have been a controversial and contentious issue in the negotiations of the TFTA is 
evidenced by the long and drawn out nature of negotiations in the TFTA RoO. The application 
of divergent RoO regimes across the three RECs making up the TFTA is further testimony to 
the fact that it is difficult to agree on a uniform RoO regime given that each REC has different 
needs suited for its member countries. Whilst COMESA and the EAC prefer an across-the-
board approach to RoO, SADC prefers a product or sector specific approach to RoO. SADC’s 
preference for a product or sector specific approach to RoO allows for the protection of certain 
products and sectors but leads to restrictive intra-regional trade in the product or specific 
sectors. This thesis emphasizes that by seeking to apply a uniform RoO regime across all three 
RECs, the TFTA RoO bring simplicity, transparency, and flexibility to RoO in the Tripartite 
territory. Simplicity is achieved through the utilization of the across the board approach to RoO 
whilst flexibility is achieved through a relaxed input sourcing requirement for non-originating 
materials.  
 
However, a lot more is suggested that would improve regional trade and economic integration 
in the TFTA. Firstly, the thesis suggests the revisiting of the SADC RoO which have been 
shown to be complex and restrictive. It is suggested that SADC RoO must be brought in line 
with the COMESA and EAC RoO to ensure a uniform RoO regime during the transitional 
period pending the coming into force of the TFTA RoO in the Tripartite territory and guidelines 
should be issued on how the RoO regimes will be applied. Secondly private and public-sector 
participation should be further encouraged, and, in this regard, important lessons can be drawn 
from the ASEAN community through its ASEAN Business Advisory Council. Lastly, it is 
suggested that there be an expedited completion of Appendix 1 to Annex 4 on RoO, which 
                                                          
438 Hartzenberg (note 245 above) 7.    
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contains the schedule of products whose originating status is determined in accordance with 
Article 5(2) of Annex 4 on RoO. The importance of this appendix cannot be overemphasized 
as its completion will bring certainty as to what tariffs will apply to what products.  
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Appendix 1A 
 
 
 
Overlapping Membership in the COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite Territory.   
 Source: Author’s illustration.   
 
SADC
EACCOMESA
Angola 
DR Congo 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Swaziland 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Burundi  
Rwanda  
Kenya 
Uganda 
Rep of South Sudan 
Tanzania 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Libya 
Seychelles  
Sudan 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
South Africa 
Namibia 
Mozambique 
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Appendix 2A 
 
TFTA Rules of Origin – Articles 2 – 8. 
 
 
Article 2 
Principles 
 
The following principles shall govern the application of these Rules of Origin:  
(a) The rules of origin shall be objective, simple and predictable;  
 
(b) The rules of origin shall facilitate intra-regional trade and shall not create distortive or 
disruptive effects on regional trade; and  
 
(c) The rules of origin shall be administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial, transparent 
and reasonable manner.  
 
Article 3 
The Concept of “Originating Products” 
 
1. For the purpose of implementing the Agreement, the following products shall be 
considered as originating in the Tripartite Member States:  
 
(a) products wholly obtained in the Tripartite Member States within the meaning of Article 4 
of this Annex;  
 
(b) products obtained in the Tripartite Member States incorporating materials which have not 
been wholly obtained there, provided that such materials have undergone sufficient working 
or processing in the member states within the meaning of Article 5 of this Annex.  
 
2. For the purpose of implementing paragraph 1, the territories of the Tripartite Member 
States shall be considered as being one territory. Originating products made up of materials 
wholly obtained or sufficiently worked or processed in two or more Tripartite Member States 
shall be considered as products originating in the Tripartite Member States where the last 
working or processing took place, provided the working or processing carried out there goes 
beyond that referred to in Article 7 of this Annex.  
 
Article 4 
Wholly Obtained Products 
 
1. The following shall be considered as wholly obtained in the Tripartite Member States  
 
(a) minerals and other naturally occurring products extracted from their soil or from their 
seabed;  
(b) vegetable products harvested therein;  
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(c) live animals born and raised therein;  
(d) products from live animals raised therein;  
(e) products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted there; products of aquaculture, 
including Mari culture, where the fish are born and raised therein  
(f) products obtained from the sea, rivers or lakes within the Tripartite Member States by 
vessels of that Member State;  
(g) products made aboard their factory ships exclusively from products referred to in 
subparagraph (f);  
(h) used articles collected there fit only for the recovery of raw materials, including used tyres 
fit only for re-treading or for use as waste;  
(i) waste and scrap resulting from manufacturing operations conducted therein; and  
(j) products extracted from marine soil or subsoil outside their territorial waters provided that 
they have sole rights to work that soil or subsoil; and  
(k) goods produced therein exclusively from the products specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to 
(j).  
 
2. The terms "their vessels" and "their factory ships" in paragraph 1(f) and 1(g) shall apply 
only to vessels and factory ships which are registered or recorded in the official records of a 
Tripartite Member State. 
  
Article 5 
Origin Criteria - 
Sufficiently Worked or Processed Products 
 
1. For the purposes of this Annex, products which are not wholly obtained are considered to 
be sufficiently worked or processed in the Tripartite Member States when:  
(a) the value of non-originating materials used in the production of the good does not exceed 
70% of the ex-works price of the good,, or  
(b) the value of the originating materials used in the production of the good is at least equal to 
30% of the ex-works price of the good.  
 
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 above, for the purposes of this Annex, products which are not 
wholly obtained in a member state and contained in the list in Appendix I are considered to 
be sufficiently worked or processed only when the conditions set out in the list are fulfilled. 
Those conditions indicate, for all products covered by the list, the change of tariff 
classification or working or processing which must be carried out on non-originating 
materials used in manufacturing and apply only in relation to such materials.  
 
3. The Tripartite Member States shall provide that all costs considered for the calculation of 
regional value content shall be recorded and maintained in conformity with the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles applicable in the territory of the Tripartite State where the 
good is produced.  
 
4. The conditions referred to above indicate the working or processing which must be carried 
out on non-originating materials used in manufacturing and apply only in relation to such 
materials. Accordingly, it follows that if a product, which has acquired originating status by 
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fulfilling the conditions set out above is used in the manufacture of another product, the 
conditions applicable to the product in which it is incorporated do not apply to it, and no 
account shall be taken of the non-originating materials which may have been used in its 
manufacture.  
 
Article 6 
Value of Materials 
 
1. For purposes of Article 5, the value of a material shall be:  
(a) for a material imported by the producer of the good, the value, determined in accordance 
with the GATT Agreement on Customs Valuation adjusted in accordance with the provisions 
of Articles 8 and 15 of the Agreement on Customs Valuation;  
 
(b) for a material acquired in the territory where the good is produced, the value, determined 
in accordance with the GATT Agreement on Customs Valuation in the same manner as for 
imported goods, with such reasonable modifications as may be required due to the absence of 
an importation; or  
 
(c) for a material that is self-produced,  
 
(i) all the expenses incurred in the production of the material, including general expenses, and  
 
(ii) an amount for profit equivalent to the profit added in the normal course of trade.  
 
2. For originating materials, the following expenses, where not included under paragraph 1, 
may be added to the value of the material:  
 
(i) the costs of freight, insurance, packing, and all other costs incurred in transporting the 
material within a Tripartite State territory or between the territories of two or more Tripartite 
Member States to the location of the producer;  
 
(ii) duties, taxes, and customs brokerage fees on the material paid in the territory of one or 
more of the member states, other than duties and taxes that are waived, refunded, refundable, 
or otherwise recoverable, including credit against duty or tax paid or payable; and  
 
(iii) the cost of waste and spoilage resulting from the use of the material in the production of 
the good, less the value of renewable scrap or by-product.  
 
3. For non-originating materials, the following expenses, where included under Article 5, 
may be deducted from the value of the material:  
 
(a) the costs of freight, insurance, packing, and all other costs incurred in transporting the 
material to a Tripartite Member State or between the territories of two or more Tripartite 
Member States to the location of the producer;  
 
(b) duties, taxes and customs brokerage fees on the material paid in the territory of one or 
more of the Tripartite Member States, other than duties and taxes that are waived, refunded, 
refundable, or otherwise recoverable, including credit against duty or tax paid or payable;  
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(c) the cost of waste and spoilage resulting from the use of the material in the production of 
the good, less the value of renewable scrap or by-product; and  
 
(d) the cost of originating materials used in the production of the non-originating material in 
the territory of a Tripartite Member State.  
 
Article 7 
Insufficient Working or Processing Operations 
 
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 below, the following operations shall be considered as 
insufficient working or processing to confer the status of originating products, whether or not 
the requirements of Articles 5 and 6 are satisfied:  
 
(a) operations to ensure the preservation of products in good condition during transport and 
storage (ventilation, spreading out, drying, chilling, placing in salt, sulphur dioxide or other 
aqueous solutions, removal of damaged parts, and like operations);  
 
(b) Simple operations consisting of removal of dust, sifting or screening, sorting, classifying, 
matching (including the making-up of sets of articles), washing, painting, cutting up;  
 
(c) changes of packaging and breaking up and assembly of packages and simple placing in 
bottles, flasks, bags, cases, boxes, fixing on cards or boards, etc., and all other simple 
packaging operations;  
 
(d) Affixing marks, labels and other like distinguishing signs on products or their packaging;  
 
(e) simple mixing of products, whether or not of different kinds, where one or more 
components of the mixtures do not meet the conditions laid down in this Annex to enable 
them to be considered as originating in a member state;  
 
(f) simple assembly of parts to constitute a complete product;  
 
(g) a combination of two or more operations specified in subparagraphs a) to f); and  
 
(h) slaughter of animals.  
 
2. All the operations carried out in either the member states on a given product shall be 
considered together when determining whether the working or processing undergone by that 
product is to be regarded as insufficient within the meaning of paragraph 1.  
 
Article 8 
Cumulation of Origin  
 
1. Products originating in any Tripartite Member State and used in further manufacture in 
another Tripartite Member State shall be treated as if they originated in the Tripartite Member 
State of further manufacture.  
 
2. Working or processing carried out in any of the Tripartite Member States shall be 
considered as having been carried out in the Tripartite Member States when the materials 
undergo further working or processing in a Tripartite Member State 
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3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and 2, products further manufactured in a Tripartite Member 
State shall be considered as originating in a Tripartite Member State where the last 
manufacturing process provided that the last working or processing operations exceeds those 
operations under article 7 of this Annex  
 
* Excerpt of Articles 2 – 8 of Annex 4 on RoO.  
 Source: TFTA Annex 4 on RoO (note 306 above).   
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